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Recent opinions by the United States Supreme Court' have engen-
dered speculation regarding the possible fate of Roe v. Wade2 and Doe
v. Bolton,3 and the continued existence and future contours of the federal
constitutional right to choose an abortion that was recognized in those
cases.4 This article makes no attempt to add to that speculation or to
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1. Though the United State Supreme Court has not to date overruled the core
holdings of Roe and Doe, certain justices have already gone on record as disfavoring
their fundamental principles. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.
Ct. 3040, 3056-58, 3064-67 (1989) (opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia);
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844
(1986), redefining the federal constitutional right of privacy as protecting only "funda-
mental liberties that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed' and which are "deeply rooted in
this nation's history and tradition." (citations omitted).
2. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), holding that the right of "privacy" implicit
in the federal Constitution limits the power of a state to interfere with a pregnant woman's
right to choose an abortion.
3. 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973), holding unconstitutional several procedural
restraints on the ability of a pregnant woman to obtain an abortion.
4. In the wake of Webster, anti-abortion activists in Louisiana moved in the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that Webster had undercut
the foundations of Roe and, on that ground, seeking overturn of the injunction that that
court had in 1976 applied against Louisiana's criminal anti-abortion laws. The court
dismissed the action without reaching the issue of the extent to which Webster had in
fact modified Roe. Weeks v. Connick, 733 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. La. 1990). On the effect
of Webster on abortion laws generally, see, e.g., Smith, Abortion: From Roe to Webster,
33 Cath. Law., 237 (1990).
A number of commentators have also raised the possibility that state constitutions may
independently protect abortion rights if and when Roe is overruled. See, e.g., Devlin,
State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal Retrenchment: Some Thoughts
on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived From Federal Sources, 3 Emerging Issues
St. Const. Law 195 (1990); Ezzard, State Constitutional Privacy Rights Post Webster-
Broader Protection Against Abortion Restrictions?, 67 Den. U.L. Rev. 401 (1990); Johnson,
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the continuing and already voluminous debate over the merits of Roe
and Doe. Instead, this article considers a separate issue that has been
obscured for almost two decades by the dominance of federal law in
this area-whether and to what extent the Louisiana State Constitution
of 1974 may independently protect a woman's right to choose an abortion
regardless of how the federal Constitution may be interpreted now or
in the future. Part I initiates this inquiry by considering the legal
background, drafting history and current interpretation of article I,
section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 which, unlike the federal
Constitution, does specifically guarantee that persons shall be free from
"unreasonable ... invasions of privacy." Part II explores and defends
the thesis that this provision should be understood as having adopted
by reference the federal law of constitutional "privacy" as it existed in
1974, including the limited right to an abortion recognized in Roe and
Doe, and that the state constitution thus incorporates and independently
protects the limited right to choose to abort that was recognized in those
cases. Part III considers how Louisiana courts should interpret article
I, section 5 in light of this incorporation, and in light of post-1974
developments in the federal courts' interpretation of abortion and other
"privacy" rights under the federal Constitution.
PROLOGUE: ON THE INDEPENDENT ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN
PROTECTiNo RIGHTS
Before turning to specifics concerning the history and interpretation
of the Louisiana constitution, a few principles governing the respective
roles of federal and state constitutions for the protection of rights should
be briefly restated. First, because of federal supremacy, all state law-
constitutional, statutory and decisional-is subordinate to, and thus may
not be applied to detract from, federal statutory or constitutional rights.5
Thus if a court were to conclude that its state constitution provides less
protection for particular rights than does the federal Constitution, its
ruling would have little practical significance; the federal constitutional
right would control. This principle of federal supremacy does not, how-
ever, work in reverse. State Declarations of Rights may provide additional
or heightened protections of individual rights-protections that go beyond
the necessary "floor" of rights mandated by the federal Constitution.
To be sure, in an era when the federal Supreme Court takes the lead
Abortion, Personhood, and Privacy in Texas, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1521, 1538-43 (1990);
Tepker, Abortion, Privacy and State Constitutional Law: A Speculation If (or When)
Roe v. Wade is Overturned, 2 Emerging Issues St. Const. Law 173 (1989); Comment,
State Constitutions: The New Battlefield for Abortion Rights, 10 Harv. Women's L.J.
284 (1987).
5. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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in defining new or expanded individual rights or in adapting the un-
derlying principles of the Constitution to changing factual circumstances,
state constitutional rights guarantees tend to receive little independent
attention or construction. But when the federal Supreme Court chooses
to construe federal rights narrowly and thus to leave to other bodies
the task of articulating and vindicating fundamental interests, the po-
tential of state constitutions to provide independent protection for in-
dividual rights again becomes relevant. As long as the additional rights
granted one litigant do not detract from the federally protected rights
of another, the state's constitutional draftsmen and its courts remain
free to provide protections which go beyond those provided by the
federal Bill of Rights.6
Second, state courts of last resort are the final authorities for the
interpretation of their respective state constitutions and are free to
interpret those state charters in ways that diverge from interpretations
of the federal Constitution, even if the language being interpreted in
the two documents is exactly the same. A fortiori, where the texts of
the relevant federal and state provisions diverge, or where the state
constitution explicitly mentions rights that are only implicitly embodied
in the federal Constitution, a state court applying that state law may
provide different protections than would a federal court applying federal
law.'
6. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980),
affirming Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), holding that the California courts were free to interpret their state
constitutional rights of free speech and petition to preclude the owner of a large private
shopping center from closing that facility to otherwise orderly persons soliciting signatures
on a petition addressed to the President and Congress, and that such an interpretation
did not infringe on any federally protected property right of the mall owner. The last
fifteen years have witnessed an explosion of cases and commentary on the power of state
constitutions to provide protections for rights which go beyond those afforded by the
federal Constitution. See Maltz, Williams & Araten, Selected Bibliography on State Con-
stitutional Law, 20 Rutgers L.J. 1093 (1989).
7. Three propositions regarding how state courts should approach the task of state
constitutional interpretation appear to garner general agreement: 1) as noted in text, state
courts are ultimately free to construe their respective state constitutions in ways that
diverge from the construction given to cognate provisions in the federal Constitution or
in sister state constitutions, and may do so even where the terms of the federal and state
guarantees are identical; but 2) state courts should nevertheless pay respectful attention
to the rationales and results of United States Supreme Court decisions construing cognate
federal rights guarantees, regarding those decisions as particularly persuasive precedent;
and 3) divergence from authoritative federal precedent, while always within the state
court's raw power, is most justifiable when the state court can point to some specific
unique local factor-such as a difference in the language or drafting history of the relevant
state and federal guarantees, some unique aspect of local history or culture which differs
from the that of the rest of the nation, some previously established body of state law,
1991]
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana has on numerous occasions ex-
pressed its agreement with these general principles and held that the
state constitution provides greater protection of individual rights than
does the federal Constitution. Louisiana courts have reached this result
both with respect to state rights guarantees phrased identically to their
federal counterparts' and, afortiori, with respect to state rights phrased
more broadly than the corresponding federal right9 or state rights that
or an evident flaw in the federal majority's reasoning-as a non-result oriented reason
for its divergence from the federal model. To be sure, courts and commentators differ
as to the relative weight and rigidity they ascribe to these factors. However, even advocates
of widely differing approaches to state constitutional interpretation do appear to accept
these propositions or their equivalents, at least in principle. See generally, Collins & Galie,
Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional In-
dividual Rights Decisions, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 317, 325 (1986) (noting that the bulk of
state decisions start from a presumption of deference to federal precedent but feel able
to diverge where that divergence is justified); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 379 (1980) (advocating the primacy and
independence of state constitutions); Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring
the Limits of Florida's "Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 653 (1987);
Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. Rev. 353 (1984).
The state court cases expressing these principles (with greater or lesser emphasis on
particular elements) are legion. A small sampling might include, e.g., State v. Gunwall,
106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-63, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (1986) (articulating the factors that must
be considered before sustaining a claim that the state constitution should be interpreted
independently); People v. Tisler, 103 I1. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984) (Illinois court
will generally follow federal precedents unless the text or history of the state provision
demonstrates a different intent); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) (examining
federal precedents before independently interpreting the state constitution); People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548-52, 531 P.2d 1099, 1111-14, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 327-30
(1975) (en banc, per Mosk, J.); Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib. of N. Wilkesboro,
285 N.C. 467-74, 206 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1974); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159. 167 (Alaska
1972). But see Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 301, 450 A.2d 925, 932 (1982)
(emphasizing the persuasiveness of federal precedent and "the general advisability in a
federal system of uniform interpretation of identical constitutional provisions").
As long as the state court makes clear that it is not relying on federal precedents, and
the state's interpretation violates no federal rights, the United States Supreme Court will
not interfere. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
8. One good example of this is that portion of La. Const. art. I, § 5 that requires
warrants and precludes unreasonable searches and seizures. Though the language employed
is virtually identical to that of the fourth amendment to the federal Constitution, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has been quite willing to interpret the state guarantee in ways
that diverge from, and provide greater protections to individuals than, its federal coun-
terpart. State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989); State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d
1381 (La. 1982); State v. Breaux, 329 So. 2d 696 (La. 1976).
9. See, e.g., Sibley v. Bd. of Sup'rs of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985)
(guarantee of equality of La. Const. art. I, § 3 differs from and must be interpreted
independently of federal fourteenth amendment "equal protection" analysis).
[Vol. 51
9 ABORTION RIGHTS
have no explicit federal analogue at all.'0 Because the federal and Louis-
iana constitutions do differ with respect to the right of "privacy"-
that right is explicitly protected in the text of the state constitution"
but has only been inferred into the federal Constitution 2-it is a par-
ticularly likely candidate for independent interpretation under the two
documents.
I. THE CONCEPT OF "PRIVACY" UNDER THE LouiSIANA STATE
CONSTI moN: OIoiN, DRAINo HIsToRY AND INTERPRETATION
Though dispute continues to rage over the possibility and desirability
of "originalist" approaches to interpretation of the federal Constitu-
tion, 3 no equivalent debate currently afflicts the parallel questions of
state constitutional interpretation. The standard view, long agreed upon
by courts and commentators, is that the intentions and understandings
of the ratifiers of state constitutions comprise a necessary starting place
and touchstone for interpretation of such documents.14 To be sure, such
10. See, e.g., State v. Spooner, 520 So. 2d 336 (La. 1988) (protections of private
property in La. Const. art. I, § 4 required invalidation of statutory presumption that
currency found in proximity to controlled substances is derivative contraband, and is thus
forfeitable); Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So. 2d 933 (La. 1984) (right of access
to public records guaranteed by La. Const. art. XII, § 3 requires court clerk to permit
microfilming of conveyance and mortgage records); Fox v. Bd. of Sup'rs of La. State
Univ., 559 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (guarantee of access to courts of La.
Const. art. I, § 22 requires that dismissal of action on forum non conveniens grounds
be without prejudice); Harleaux v. Wood, 542 So. 2d 747 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989);
Duroncelet v. Doley, 530 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (guarantee of La. Const
art. V, § 22 that all judges shall be elected limits the conclusory effect of credibility
determinations by unelected court commissioners).
11. La. Const. art. I, § 5, quoted infra, note 48.
12. See discussion infra, notes 23-35.
13. Briefly, "originalist" approaches to Constitutional interpretation are those that
ascribe conclusive weight to the understanding of the document that prevailed at the time
it was adopted. Originalists are further subdivided into "textualists," who give primary
weight to the words of the document, and "intentionalists," who endeavor to determine
from extra-textual sources what the constitution's framers intended their words to mean.
"Non-originalist" approaches look instead or in addition to other, generally present-day,
sources of meaning. For critical summaries of these various approaches made with reference
to the federal Constitution, see, e.g., Simien, It Is a Constitution We Are Expounding,
18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 67 (1990); and Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204 (1980), from whom the terminology used here is
taken.
14. The lack of debate regarding the utility of originalist approaches to interpretation
of state constitutions appears to result, at least in part, from the differences in form and
function between state constitutions and their federal counterpart, most of which favor
greater reliance on originalist approaches to interpretation of state charters. Since the
current Louisiana constitution was enacted in the recent past, interpretation of its language
is not hampered by changes over time in the meanings of words or by changing social
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reliance on "intent" should not be misunderstood as referring to the
unexpressed purposes, agendas or subjective understandings of any per-
son or group of people. Rather, as the Louisiana Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized, the relevant intent is the "public" intent that
could be gathered by a knowledgeable but objective observer from such
non-subjective sources as the text itself," the structure of the document
as a whole,' 6 the drafting history of particular provisions, 7 extrinsic
sources for defining ambiguous phrases or "terms of art,"'' and the
and political realities. Extensive and reliable record evidence is available from which the
intentions of state draftsmen can be discerned. Since state constitutions such as Louisiana's
are more readily amended than their federal counterpart, there is less need for courts to
take it upon themselves to adapt the document to changing times. And since state charters
are typically far longer, more detailed and "statute-like" than is the United States Con-
stitution-relatively less concerned with basic issues and more devoted to enshrining
particular policies or detailing government operations-it makes sense to construe them
with more regard for their drafters' particular purposes and perhaps with less concern
for natural law, grand issues of fundamental justice or other philosophical verities. See
generally, Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 169,
195-201 (1983); Levinson, Interpreting State Constitutions by Resort to the Record, 6 Fla.
St. L. Rev. 567, 569-71 (1978) (noting the general consensus among commentators that
for state constitutions, the "original intent [of the people who adopted the constitution]
should be ascertained and respected"); T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations Which Rest Upon The Legislative Power of the States of the American Union
68-70 (5th ed. 1883).
By way of clarification, it should be noted that the reference to "ratifiers" was
intentional. Before ratification, the draft constitution of 1974 was a mere proposal, without
force or effect. The political act that made the constitution of 1974 binding was the vote
of the people; it is the understanding that can be reasonably ascribed to that voting
population as a whole that controls. Arguments from the constitution's "plain text" or
the convention debates are useful primarily for the light they may shed on how the people
would have understood the document.
15. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm'rs v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 496 So. 2d 281, 298
(La. 1986) (construction should be guided by "a fair interpretation of the language
employed"); State ex rel. Guste v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 456 So. 2d 605, 609 (La. 1984)
("unambiguous" constitutional language precludes resort to other techniques of interpre-
tation); Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So. 2d 704, 707 (La. 1983) (same); Bank of New Orleans
and Trust Co. v. Seavey, 383 So. 2d 354, 356 (La. 1980) (same); City of Baton Rouge
v. Short, 345 So. 2d 37, 40 (La. 1977).
16. 496 So. 2d at 278-88 (looking to the overall structure of the 1974 constitution,
among other factors); Barnett v. Develle, 289 So. 2d 129, 146 (La. 1974) (same).
17. New Orleans, etc. v. Civil Serv., etc., 422 So. 2d 402, 407-09 (La. 1982) (relying
on convention records); Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ. v. Nix, 347 So. 2d 147,
150-51 (La. 1977) (interpreting a disputed provision by examining its history and devel-
opment); Jones v. LaBarbera, 342 So. 2d 1125, 1127 (La. 1977) (same).
18. State Bond Comm'n v. All Taxpayers, 510 So. 2d 662, 666 (La. 1987) (treating
the word "debt" as a term of art and looking to decisions of other jurisdictions to define
that term); 422 So. 2d at 412 (looking to federal jurisprudence to define whether a scheme
of compensation constituted a "minimum wage law"); State ex rel. Kemp v. City of
Baton Rouge, 215 La. 315, 323-27, 40 So. 2d 477, 480-81 (1949) (interpreting state
constitution by examining decisions regarding similar provisions in other state constitutions).
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perceived evil which the constitutional drafters were seeking to correct.' 9
Accordingly, it is to such objective sources of the meaning of "privacy"
that one must first turn to determine the status of abortion rights under
the state constitution.
A. Legal Background: the Concept of Constitutional "Privacy" in
1973-1974
By the period from January 1973 through April 1974, when the
present Louisiana constitution was drafted, debated and ultimately rat-
ified, the concept of "privacy" had already acquired a number of
divergent legal meanings. As a concept in private law, the right of
privacy was already well rooted in the jurisprudence of virtually all
states, including Louisiana.20 As a concept in constitutional law, the
right of privacy was of more recent origin. Nevertheless, by that time,
the right of privacy in its constitutional sense had already been generally
conceived as potentially protecting three related but distinguishable types
of interests: the right to be free of unreasonable surveillance and intrusion
("searchl and seizure" rights);2 the right to prevent the accumulation
19. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 496 So. 2d 281, 287-88 (La. 1986) (looking
at, among other things, the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision at
issue); 342 So. 2d at 1127 (looking to "the nature and object of the provision under
consideration").
20. The right of privacy in this sense has deep roots in Louisiana jurisprudence. As
long ago as 1905, the Louisiana courts adopted the classic Warren and Brandeis formulation
of the right protected by the tort of invasion of privacy as a right to be "let alone."
Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 482, 39 So. 499, 500 (1905). Compare Warren and
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). The Louisiana law of privacy
in its sense as a private tort (or delict) has been rooted primarily in La. Civ. Code art.
2315. Parish Nat'l Bank v. Lane, 397 So. 2d 1282 (La. 1981), citing Pack v. Wise, 155
So. 2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) and Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App.
Orl. 1944).
In analyzing the parameters of the concept of privacy in this sense, the Louisiana courts
have "adopted, in wholesale fashion, the four branch analysis of Dean Prosser and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts." Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enterprises, 530 So. 2d
643, 647 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), citing Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So.
2d 1386, 1387-89 n.2 (La. 1979). See also Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 430 (La.
1983); Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, 521 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Norris
v. King, 355 So. 2d 21, 23 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978). For an overview of the current
jurisprudence see generally, W. P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser
and Keeton on Torts 849-68 (5th ed. 1984).
21. The concept of constitutional privacy in this sense, as a shield against surveillance
and intrusion, is enshrined in the federal fourth amendment and was also first articulated
long ago. See, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting from the Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of a
wiretap, and arguing that the federal constitution protects a fundamental "right to be let
alone" by the government); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 532
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and dissemination of certain kinds of information about oneself ("dis-
closural" rights);22 and the right to make certain choices about one's
personal or family life-including but not limited to the right to decide
to terminate a pregnancy-free from undue or unnecessary government
interference ("autonomy" rights).
Though hints of things to come can be found in earlier decisions2 3
the United States Supreme Court first clearly articulated the right of
constitutional privacy in its autonomy sense in Griswold v. Connecticut,2
some eight years before the current Louisiana constitution was drafted.
(1886) (noting that the federal fourth and fifth amendments operate to protect "the
privacies of life").
In its modern incarnation the right of privacy in this sense appears to have two branches.
One, originating from Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1247-
48 (1969), ascribes a special significance to the home as a place where government cannot
intrude without sufficient reason. A second branch originates from Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967), in which the Court held that federal fourth amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures apply where, but only where, the
person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the particular activity being observed
or recorded.
22. The constitutional right of privacy in this sense was frequently litigated in the
lower federal courts during this period, and was much on the., minds of constitutional
draftsmen in this and other states. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1974) (tracing the Louisiana privacy provision
to, among other things, "fear of unrestrained gathering and dissemination of information
on individuals through use of computer data banks"); Note, Toward a Right of Privacy
as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 631, 702-04 n.364 (1977)
(quoting election brochure distributed to California voters before the California privacy
guarantee was ratified); Id. at 717-18 (quoting the Final Report of the Committee to
Make a Study of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895 to the same effect with regard
to the South Carolina privacy guarantee). See generally, Peck, Extending the Constitutional
Right to Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 893, 907-08 (1984).
23. The substantive concept of "due process," which formed the conceptual linchpin
of the ill-remembered Lochner era, was not applied only in the service of property rights
and entrepreneurial freedom. On the contrary, during that era the Supreme Court of the
United States also had occasion to hold that the due process guarantee of the federal
fourteenth amendment required invalidation of state statutes which it found to unduly
interfere with an individual's right to exercise autonomous control over certain personal
and family decisions. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names, etc.,
268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925) (state cannot preclude parents from sending children
to parochial schools). Even after the collapse of economic substantive due process, the
federal Supreme Court continued to protect some unenumerated rights and "fundamental"
liberty interests from unreasonable infringement, under a variety of doctrinal formulations.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163 (1958) (deriving a right of association
as a necessary ancillary to the first amendment); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232, 77 S. Ct. 752 (1957) (protecting the right to practice one's profession); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942) (striking down, on equal protection
grounds, a state statute authorizing sterilization for some types of repeat criminal of-
fenders).
24. 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
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In Griswold, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal Bill
of Rights required invalidation of a Connecticut statute which restricted
the ability of a married couple to obtain and use contraceptives. The
constitutional right of autonomy privacy that was recognized in Griswold
does not appear explicitly anywhere in the text of the federal Bill of
Rights. Instead this right was derived by various members of the Court
from various constitutional sources, including the necessary "penum-
bras" cast by several specific constitutional guarantees, 5 from the Ninth
Amendment and its reservation of rights deeply rooted in the American
legal tradition,26 from the concept of fundamental rights "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,'"'2 or from the special status of marital
and familial relationships.2"
The inability of the Court in Griswold to articulate a consensus
regarding the origin or nature of the federal constitutional right of
privacy in this autonomy sense made it aifficult for courts to come to
any clear understanding regarding the precise nature or limits of that
right, and inhibited the extension of that right to new contexts. 29 The
doctrine was in 1974 and remains today characterized by considerable
uncertainty as to its proper interpretation, scope and application. °
25. Id. at 482-85, 85 S. Ct. at 1680-82 (Douglas, J., for the Court).
26. Id. at 487-94, 85 S. Ct. at 1683-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 500-01, 85 S. Ct. at 1690-91 (Harlan. J., concurring).
28. Id. at 502-03, 85 S. Ct. at 1691-92 (White, J., concurring).
29. Before 1975, Louisiana courts cited Griswold only once, rejecting an attempt by
a public schoolteacher to enjoin a school rule requiring him to wear a necktie. Blanchet
v. Vermilion Parish School Bd., 220 So. 2d 534, 539 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). Federal
district courts in Louisiana were, during that period, equally unsympathetic to proposed
extensions of Griswold, regularly rejecting attempts to extend its holding to a variety of
purported autonomy interests. See, e.g., Louisiana Affiliate of the Nat'l Org. for Reform
of Marijuana Laws v. Guste, 380 F. Supp. 404 (E.D.La. 1974) (rejecting challenge to
state laws criminalizing private possession and use of marijuana); Rosen v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970) (rejecting challenge
to statute authorizing revocation of the license of physicians providing abortions); Pratz
v. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 316 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. La. 1970) (rejecting challenge
to parietal regulations at state higher education institution); Davis v. Firment, 269 F.
Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967) (rejecting challenge to school hair-length regulations). But see
Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 413 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1969) (relying in part on Griswold's
concern for familial privacy to uphold trial court's refusal to inquire into the legitimacy
of child purporting to be a Jones Act beneficiary); Scott v. District Attorney, 309 F.
Supp. 833, 837 n.9 (E.D. La. 1970) (relying on Griswold, among many other cases, as
collateral support for decision ruling state criminal loitering statute unconstitutional).
30. Academic writings debating the merits of the Griswold line of cases are too
numerous to mention. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that by 1974, the issue was already
the subject of a strenuous debate. See, e.g., Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Colum.
L. Rev. 1410 (1974); Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental
and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 235 (1965); Symms & Hawks,
The Threads of Privacy: The Judicial Evolution of a "Right to Privacy" and Current
19911
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Nevertheless, by the early 1970's, a consensus had emerged that the
federal constitutional right of privacy articulated in Griswold ex-
tended well beyond the facts of that case, and protected a wide
range of interests in familial relations,3 1 private sexual conduct,3 2
Legislative Trends, 11 Idaho L. Rev. 11, 13-21 (1974) (tracing the failure of the Griswold
line of cases to expand to the Court's failure to adequately define the rights of "privacy"
it announced in that case); Rhoades & Patula, The Ninth Amendment: A Survey of
Theory and Practice in the Federal Courts Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 50 Denver L.J.
153, 170 (1973) (same).
31. Prior to 1974, federal courts had relied on Griswold as an exclusive or alternate
ground to protect "family" rights in a number of contexts. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974) (striking down overbroad state
rules mandating termination of pregnant schoolteachers); United States Dep't of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S, 528, 535 n.7, 93 S. Ct. 2821, 2826 n.7 (1973) (noting with apparent
approval the conclusion of the lower court in that case that if the federal government
were to seek to justify its denial of foodstamps to unrelated or unmarried persons living
together as a means to foster "morality," it would likely violate the principles established
in Griswold); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 1823-24 (1967) (relying
on autonomy privacy rights as an alternative ground on which to strike down state laws
prohibiting marriage between persons of different races); Berch v. Stahl, 373 F. Supp.
412, 423-24 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (protecting the right of prison inmates to communicate with
their spouses); Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298, 300 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (protecting the
rights of married high school students to participate in school activities). Since 1974, the
federal Supreme Court has continued to expand this aspect of the Griswold analysis. See,
e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987) (striking down prison regulation
forbidding inmates to marry without consent of warden, on finding of compelling reasons);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin
statute that required residents under child support obligations to show that they were in
compliance with those prior obligations before they would be permitted to marry and
start a second family); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932
(1977) (striking down a zoning ordinance that prohibited even related individuals from
sharing living quarters unless they were within a specified degree of consanguinity). But
see Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 106 S. Ct. 2727 (1986) (upholding federal regulation
that automatically treated parents, children and siblings as a single household for food
stamps while permitting unrelated persons living together to get greater benefits by es-
tablishing separate households); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S. Ct.
1536 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordinance prohibiting three or more persons living together
unless they are related by blood).
32. As with respect to family rights, prior to 1974 federal courts tended to rely on
Griswold as an exclusive or alternate ground to protect individual choices to engage in
private consensual sexual activities that others might consider immoral. Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564-65, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1247-48 (1969) (relying on privacy rights as well
as the first amendment to hold that states may not criminalize mere possession of allegedly
obscene material in the privacy of one's own home); In Re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924,
927 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (federal government precluded from denying naturalization to an
individual solely because he engaged in private homosexual activity with other consenting
adults); Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485, 488 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (federal government could not discharge a postal clerk solely because he was living
with a woman to whom he was not married). See also Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp.
620, 626 (E.D. Va. 1973) (indicating that if petitioners had kept their homosexual relations
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and personal autonomy3 3 from excessive or unnecessary government
interference. In the area of contraceptive rights the federal Supreme
Court had, by the time the present Louisiana constitution was drafted
and adopted, put to rest an earlier controversy by squarely holding that
the right to obtain contraceptives established in Griswold extended to
unmarried persons,3 4 and a number of successful challenges had already
been mounted to statutes which narrowly restricted how and by whom
non-prescription contraceptives could be distributed."
With regard to the more controversial question of whether the federal
constitutional right of autonomy privacy included the right of a pregnant
woman to choose an abortion, there was much litigation but, before
1973, little consensus. During the early 1970's, state and federal courts
in Louisiana repeatedly heard and rejected constitutional challenges to
truly private they would have been entitled to protection under Griswold).
In recent years, however, the federal Supreme Court has significantly cut back on this
aspect of federal privacy rights. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841
(1986) (rejecting federal privacy rights challenge to state statute prohibiting private acts
of homosexual sodomy between consenting adults).
33. Prior to 1974, a number of lower federal courts had held that the right recognized
in Griswold extended to prevent unreasonable state interference with a person's right to
dress or wear his hair as he pleases. See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir.
1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d
1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937, 90 S. Ct. 1836 (1970); Seal v. Mertz,
338 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Black v. Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468 (D. Neb. 1970);
Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F.
Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. ,Minn. 1969). However,
courts were far from united on the proposition that the rights recognized in Griswold
applied in this context. See, for cases denying the extension, Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d
258, 260-61 (10th Cir. 1971) and cases cited. As was the case with respect to sexual
activity, after 1974 the Supreme Court significantly limited this particular aspect of the
federal constitutional right of privacy. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 96 S. Ct. 1440
(1976) (upholding against constitutional challenge a police regulation regarding the length
of officers' hair).
34. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1971), concluding that drawing
a distinction between married and unmarried persons with respect to the fundamental
right recognized in Griswold would violate equal protection.
35. See, e.g., Baird v. Lynch, 390 F. Supp. 740, 745-46 (W.D. Wis. 1974) (indicating
that state statute facially restricting exhibits and displays of contraceptives would be
unconstitutional, but abstaining so that state courts could impose a limiting construction);
Population Services Int'l v. Wilson, 383 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. N.Y. 1974) (denying motion
to dismiss challenge to state statute precluding sale of contraceptives to minors, allowing
only licensed pharmacists to sell them and limiting their advertisement and display). After
1974, the federal courts continued to expand the Griswold analysis in this context, striking
down laws and practices which unduly restricted access to contraceptives. See, e.g., Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Products, 463 U.S. 60, 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983); Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977); Postscript Enterprises v. Whaley, 658
F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1981); Arneth v. Gross, 699 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Utah 1983).
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the state's criminal anti-abortion statute.36 Results in other states were
mixed. Some courts found that the federal constitutional right of au-
tonomy privacy articulated in Griswold included the right to choose an
abortion. 7 Others, like the Louisiana courts, rejected such claims.1 8
In January of 1973, however, the United States Supreme Court put
an end to this controversy, holding in Roe v. Wade" and Doe v. Bolton'O
that the federal constitutional right of privacy recognized in Griswold
provided some protection for the right of a pregnant woman to choose
to terminate her pregnancy through an abortion free from unnecessary
or excessive government interference. To be sure, these initial decisions
did not immediately remove all areas of uncertainty and disagreement
regarding the scope and interpretation of the abortion right. Important
questions-such as, for example, application of Roe to minors, proce-
dural and methodological requirements of Roe and the obligation of
government to fund abortions for indigents-remained for future de-
36. See, e.g., Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp.
1217 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated, 412 U.S. 902, 93 S. Ct. 2285 (1973) (3-judge district court,
upholding Louisiana statute authorizing suspension or revocation of M.D.'s license if he
is involved in an abortion (except to save the life of the mother) against several federal
constitutional challenges, including challenge based on privacy rights in the autonomy
sense); State v. Campbell, 263 La. 1058, 270 So. 2d 506 (1972) (rejecting federal con-
stitutional "privacy" challenge to state statute criminalizing abortion); State v. Scott, 260
La. 190, 255 So. 2d 736 (1971) (same); State v. Shirley, 256 La. 665, 237 So, 2d 676
(1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 926, 91 S. Ct. 891, reh'g denied, 402 U.S. 925, 91 S. Ct.
1383 (1971); State v. Pesson, 256 La. 201, 235 So. 2d 568 (1970).
37. The cases are legion. A representative sampling would include, e.g., Abele v.
Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D.Conn. 1972); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J.
1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, vacated, 475 F.2d 1398, aff'd, 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir.
1974); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D.I11. 1971), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973);
Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1, 91 S.
Ct. 12 (1970); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S. Ct. 920 (1970); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1972); Sturgis v. Attorney Gen., 358 Mass. 37, 260 N.E.2d 687 (1970).
38. These cases too are many. A sampling would include, e.g., Crossen v. Attorney
Gen., 344 F. Supp. 587 (E.D.Ky. 1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 950, 93 S. Ct. 1413 (1973);
Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971), vacated, 410 U.S. 950, 93 S.
Ct. 1411 (1973); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Doe v. Bolton,
319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), rev'd, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973); Roe v.
Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D.Tex. 1970), rev'd, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973);
Thompson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1971), vacated, 410 U.S. 950, 93 S. Ct. 1411
(1973); Cheaney v. State, 259 Ind. 138, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972); Spears v. State, 257 So.
2d 876 (Miss. 1972).
39. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), striking down a Texas statute prohibiting
abortion except to save the life of the mother.
40. 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973), invalidating a number of procedural restrictions
on abortions, including a special accreditation requirement for hospitals performing abor-
tions and a requirement of approval by two additional physicians.
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cision .4 Indeed, many of these issues remain unsettled today. However,
by January of 1973, when the Louisiana Constitutional Convention was
meeting in its first organizational sessions, Roe and Doe had made clear
that the right of "privacy" in its federal constitutional sense extended
to and included some significant limits on the power of governments
to interfere with the ability of a pregnant woman to obtain an abortion.
In addition to the federal developments, several states had, by 1973,
amended or interpreted their respective state constitutions to also provide
explicit protection for the right of "privacy." 4 2 Though none of the
41. Since 1974, the abortion controversy has continued to generate a large number
of cases, in which the federal Supreme Court has made fine distinctions between permissible
and impermissible statutory restraints on abortions. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990) (parental notification requirement upheld);
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (parental notification statute upheld in
part, struck down in part); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989) (upholding statute defining life as beginning at conception, barring state employees
or public facilities from performing abortions, and requiring physician to perform tests
to determine viability); Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 106
S. Ct. 2169 (1986) (striking down propaganda-laden "informed consent" requirement,
detailed and publicly available record keeping* requirements and burdensome requirements
for salvaging post-viability fetuses); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 103 S. Ct.
2532 (1983) (upholding statute requiring second trimester abortions to be performed in
hospitals); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983)
(upholding parental or judicial consent requirement); City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) (striking down statute limiting
abortions to hospitals, mandating a waiting period and mandating, under guise of "in-
formed consent," anti-abortion propaganda by physician); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981) (upholding statute requiring physician to notify parents before
performing abortion on an unemancipated minor); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100
S. Ct. 2671 (1980) (upholding exclusion of abortions from federal medical aid to indigent
women); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979) (striking down statute
requiring parental consent or judicial proceeding for abortion on juvenile); Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977) (city hospital providing maternity services may
refuse to perform abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977)
(government not required to subsidize abortions even though it does subsidize childbirth);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976) (upheld so much
of state statute as defined fetal viability, required maternal written consent and required
keeping certain records; striking down so much as banned saline amniocentesis as abortion
method after 12 weeks, required spousal consent in some circumstances, and required
parental consent in all cases).
42. Between 1968 and 1973, six states amended their respective state constitutions to
provide explicit protection for a right of "privacy." These amendments took several forms.
The initial approach, adopted by Hawaii, Illinois and South Carolina-and ultimately by
Louisiana as well-simply added language prohibiting "unreasonable ... invasions of
privacy" to each state's respective guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Haw. Const. art. I, § 7; Ill. Const. art. I, § 6; S.C. Const. art. 1, § 10.
California pursued a unique approach, adding "privacy" to the list of fundamental rights
declared to be basic and inalienable. Cal. Const. art. 1, § 1. The final approach, adopted
by Montana and Alaska, involved the enactment of wholly new, free-standing sections of
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early 1970's decisions interpreting these provisions specifically addressed
the question of abortion rights, some do provide additional evidence
that the concept of constitutional privacy was already generally under-
stood to potentially protect autonomy rights of the sort articulated in
Griswold and its progeny. 43
B. Drafting the Guarantee: How "Privacy" Entered the Louisiana
Constitution
By the early 1970's, the existing Louisiana constitution of 1921 had
evolved into a massive, unwieldy and outdated document, full of detailed
rules and restrictions more appropriate for legislative treatment and
burdened by 536 separate amendments." In 1972, in response to the
pressures caused by the inadequacies of the existing constitution and
the unwillingness of Louisiana's voters to continue passing large numbers
of amendments every year, the state legislature passed a measure au-
thorizing and organizing a convention charged with drafting a new,
streamlined charter for the state.4 5 Although dissatisfaction with the
individual rights provisions of the prior state constitution played no
discernable role in the events leading to the calling of the convention
of 1973-74, the convention's mandate was plenary. All aspects of the
the states' respective declarations of rights, each of which explicitly protected some right
of "privacy." Alaska Const. art. I, § 22; Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
43. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974) (explicit state constitutional
right of privacy limited ability of state to criminalize private use of marijuana); Breese
v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972) (right of privacy inferred into state constitution
precluded enforcement of student hair length regulations); State v. Silva, 491 P.2d 1216
(Haw. 1971) (statutory rape prosecution, Levinson, J., dissenting, suggested that the right
of privacy invalidated some laws regulating consensual sex); State v. Rocker, 475 P.2d
684 (Haw. 1970) (deciding on the merits that state right of privacy did not protect nude
sunbathing on a public beach); Stein v. Howlett, 52 Il. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972)
(upholding Illinois Government Ethics Act; taking a broad view of privacy but concluding
that there was a compelling state interest). Other state courts reached similar results on
the basis of an unexpressed right of "privacy" which they found to be implicit in their
state constitutions. See, e.g., Yoo v. Moynihan, 28 Conn. Supp. 375, 262 A.2d 814
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1969) (school dress code struck down); Murphy v. Pocatello School
Dist. No. 25, 94 Idaho 32, 480 P.2d 878 (1971) (same); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli,
34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974) (zoning ordinance limiting
family units struck down).
44. On the origin of the Constitutional Convention of 1973, see generally W. Hargrave,
The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 16-18 (1991); Carleton, Elitism
Sustained: The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 560, 561-65 (1980).
45. 1972 La. Acts No. 2. To a limited but still significant degree, the Louisiana
Constitutional Convention of 1973-74 fulfilled the hopes of its advocates, greatly reducing
the constitution's bulk and successfully excising a number of matters more appropriately




state constitution, including its rights provisions, were to be scrutinized.
As revised and adopted, the Declaration of Rights of the new constitution
retained, with relatively minor amendment, both the overall plan and
many specific provisions from its 1921 predecessor. However, the drafters
of the Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana constitution of 1974 did
go beyond the prior charter to include several wholly new provisions46
and a number of revisions to preexisting guarantees, 47 all of which
significantly expanded the protections given to individual rights. Among
these innovations was an amendment to the search and seizure provisions
of the previous constitution, adding a new and explicit guarantee that
"Every person shall be secure ... against unreasonable invasions of
privacy.""
The 132 delegates to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of
1973 initially convened in January 1973 for the purpose of electing
officers, adopting rules of procedure and organizing themselves into
eight committees, each of which was given responsibility for initially
drafting one or more articles of the new constitution.49 One of those
46. See, e.g., La. Const. art. 1, § 3 (titled the "Right to Individual Dignity,"
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws); La. Const. art. I, § 10 (guaranteeing the right
to vote); La. Const. art. I, § 12 (prohibiting private discrimination in facilities open to
the public); La. Const. art. I, § 14 (guaranteeing the right to preliminary examination in
felony cases not commenced by grand jury indictment); La. Const. art. 1, § 16 (guaranteeing
the presumption of innocence); La. Const. art. I, § 19 (guaranteeing judicial review upon
a record). See generally Hargrave, supra note 22, at 6-10, 31-35, 37-40, 48-53, 60-62.
47. See, e.g., La. Const. art. I, § 4 (private property); La. Const. art. I, § 21 (the
writ of habeas corpus). See generally, Hargrave, supra note 22, at 14-20, 65.
48. As finally adopted, La. Const. art. I, § 5 provides in full as follows:
Right to Privacy
Section 5. Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communi-
cations, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or
invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the
search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in
violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate
court.
49. The Louisiana courts have frequently taken judicial notice that the Louisiana
Constitutional Convention of 1973 did its work by committees, and that the expressed
intentions and deliberations of those drafting committees can shed important light on how
the constitution should be interpreted. See, e.g., Sibley v. Bd. of Sup'rs, 477 So. 2d
1094, 1108 (La. 1985) (relying on statements by drafting committee spokesman to the full
convention to elucidate the intended meaning of La. Const. art. 1, § 3); State v. Reeves,
427 So. 2d 403, 405-406 (La. 1982) (considering the drafts and debates of the Committee
on Bill of Rights and Elections to interpret La. Const. art. I, § 5); South Cent. Bell Tel.
Co. v. Louisiana, etc., 412 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (La. 1982) (relying on statements of drafting
committee spokesman regarding La. Const. art. IV, § 21(B)); State v. Culotta, 343 So.
2d 977, 981-82 (La. 1977) (relying on report of the Committee on Bill of Rights and
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committees, the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections, was charged
with the responsibility to "consider the Preamble, Bill of Rights, Human
Rights, Obligations of Citizenship, distribution of powers, suffrage and
elections, the amendment process, and future constitutional conven-
tions. ' ' 50 On January 31, 1973, the full convention adjourned sine die
so that its various committees could hear witnesses, debate proposed
language, and draft proposals for their respective portions of the new
constitution.
Though no verbatim transcripts of the deliberations of the various
drafting committees were preserved, there is evidence that the Committee
on Bill of Rights and Elections was aware of the significance and possible
ramifications of including an express guarantee of privacy in the state
constitution. Given the time period when the committee met-during
the months immediately following the United States Supreme Court's
controversial and well publicized decisions in Roe and Doe which held
that the federal constitutional right of "privacy" included a limited right
to an abortion-it seems scarcely possible that the committee members
could have failed to appreciate the potential import of a state consti-
tutional right of "privacy."'" This conclusion does not, however, rest
on inference alone. There is also evidence that these issues were explicitly
presented. Witnesses before the committee specifically recommended that
the new Declaration of Rights include an explicit guarantee of privacy
that would go beyond the traditional prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures already embodied in the federal fourth amendment and the
Elections to the Convention regarding the meaning of La. Const. art. I, § 5). See also
Jones v. LaBarbera, 342 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), taking judicial notice
that the work of the convention was accomplished by separate committees, and for that
reason refusing to place determinative weight on a slight difference of language between
two sections drafted by different committees.
50. 1 Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutioial Convention of 1973
of the State of Louisiana [hereinafter "Official Journal"], 4th Days Proceedings, 31
(January 16, 1973). Delegates were allowed to choose the drafting committee on which
they would serve. The ten members of the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections
were delegates Judy Dunlap, Anthony Guarisco, Alphonse Jackson, Louis (Woody) Jenkins,
Chris Roy, Mrs. Novyse Soniat, Ford Stinson, Kendall Vick, Shady Wall & Dr. Gerald
Weiss. Id., 8th Days Proceedings at 61 (January 30, 1973). The members of the Committee
on Bill of Rights and Elections elected delegate Alphonse Jackson as Chairman of the
Committee. Id., 9th Days Proceedings at 66 (January 31, 1973).
51. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Roe and Doe were, not
surprisingly, well reported by Louisiana newspapers. See, e.g., Baton Rouge Morning
Advocate, January 23, 1973, at 1, col. 1, noting explicitly that the Roe decision could
"nix" the Louisiana anti-abortion laws. In 1973, the issue of abortion rights was a matter
of widespread public debate, and public support for an expanded right of abortion was
growing. By January 1973, polls indicated that the Louisiana public was evenly divided
on the question of legalizing abortion. Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, January 28, 1973,
at B3, col. I.
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Louisiana Constitution of 1921.2 The background materials prepared
for the committee by the convention's research staff included copies of
rights declarations of several states, nations and international organi-
zations, many of which-including the rights provisions then recently
incorporated into the Montana," Illinois14 and Hawaii" state constitu-
52. X Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Committee Doc-
uments [hereinafter "Records: Committee Documents"] 7, April 7, 1973, recording the
testimony of Dr. Francine Merritt, representing Common Cause and the American As-
sociation of University Women, in favor of several proposals for inclusion in the new
Declaration of Rights, including the following:
"The Right To Privacy"
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.
See also, id., recording the testimony of Ms. Debra Millenson, representing the Council
for a New State Constitution, in favor of, among other things, "a strong right to privacy."
53. Constitutional Convention of the State of Louisiana of 1973-Documents Supplied
to the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections Committee [hereinafter "Committee
Document"] No. 10, "Additioni Rights Articles in Proposed, Adopted and Rejected
State Constitutions Arranged in Reverse Chronological Order," presented March 30, 1973.
The relevant provision of the Montana Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. Right of Privacy
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 10, ratified June 6, 1972.
54. Committee Document No. 1, "Background Materials for the Committee on Bill
of Rights and Elections," presented March 16, 1973. The relevant provision of the Illinois
Constitution provides as follows:
Section 6. Searches, Seizures, Privacy and Interceptions
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy
or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means.
No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
I11. Const. art. I, § 6, ratified December 15, 1970 (emphasis added).
55. Committee Document No. 10, supra note 53. The relevant provision of the Hawaii
Constitution provides as follows:
Searches, Seizures and Invasions of Privacy
Section 7' The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of privacy shall
not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized or the communications sought to be intercepted.
Haw. Const. art. 1, § 7; amended by constitutional convention of 1968 and ratified
November 5, 1968 to add "privacy" language (emphasis added).
In addition to the three state constitutional privacy guarantees presented to the committee,
three other states also had, by 1973, adopted state constitutional guarantees of privacy.
Alaska Const. art. I, § 22; Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (amended to add "privacy" language
in 1972, rewritten into present form in 1974); S.C. Const. art. I, § 10. See generally
Devlin, supra note 4, at 210-17 (1990).
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tions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,5 6 the European Dec-
laration on Human Rights, 7 and the American Convention on Human
Rights 5S-provided, in one form or another, for a guarantee of individual
"privacy." Although the Montana, Hawaii and Illinois provisions had
not, as of 1973, been authoritatively interpreted to protect autonomy
rights, it has since been made clear that the latter two at least were
intended to do so.19 In any event, the language of these various pro-
56. Committee Document No. 7, "The Bill of Rights and Human Rights: Represen-
tative International Documents," presented March 17, 1973. The Universal Declaration
Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. It reads, in relevant part, as
follows:
Article 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to any attacks upon his honor and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
or attacks.
2 United Nations Resolutions, Series I, General Assembly 1948-49, 137-38 (1973).
57. Committee Document No. 7, supra note 56. The European Convention on Human
Rights was adopted by the Council of Europe and entered into force in 1953. It reads,
in relevant part, as follows:
Article 8
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others.
European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Texts 5 (7th ed. 1971).
58. Committee Document No. 7, supra note 56. The American Convention on Human
Rights was adopted under the auspices of the Organization of American States. It was
drafted in 1969, but had not yet, as of 1973, entered into force. It reads, in relevant
part, as follows:
Article 11. Right to Privacy
1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity rec-
ognized.
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his
private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks
on his honor or reputation.
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
or attacks.
59. The drafting history of the Montana privacy provision indicates that it was
intended to incorporate some Griswold-type autonomy privacy provisions. See Elison &
Nettik Simmons, Right of Privacy, 48 Mont. L. Rev. 1, 13 n.83 (1987). However, the
courts of that state have not yet had occasion to interpret that provision to do so.
In Illinois, in contrast, the state constitutional privacy provision was initially and for
many years interpreted narrowly, as protecting only traditional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. See, e.g., People v. Tisler, 103 I11. 2d 226, 242, 469 N.E.2d 147,
155-56 (1984) (Illinois privacy amendment "does no more than specifically provide for
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visions, which is all that the drafting committee had before it, could
well have been understood to embrace a broad definition of the right
of privacy. The international model provisions, in particular, make ref-
erence to and were apparently intended to protect, among other things,
privacy in the family and personal autonomy sense of that term.
The specific drafting history of section 5 also indicates that the
crucial language was intended by the committee to incorporate a broad
range of privacy interests, including autonomy rights in the Griswold
sense. In April 1973, the committee began to consider specific proposals
and language. Several delegates had prepared individual drafts for a
declaration of rights which were, together with a draft drawn from the
earlier Projet,6° collated and presented to the committee as a single
fourth amendment protection with regard to eavesdropping and invasion of privacy");
Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974) (relying
on the placement of the privacy guarantee within the general search and seizure provision
to narrow its application). However, recent decisions of the Illinois courts show that the
privacy guarantee is presently construed to apply to a significant number of autonomy
interests. Family Life League v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 112 Ill. 2d 449, 454, 493 N.E.2d
1054, 1057 (1986) (announcing that state provision incorporates rights of the type recognized
in Griswold and Roe). As the Illinois courts and commentators have come to realize, the
drafting history of that provision does indicate that the crucial language was originally
intended to incorporate some protection for interests in personal autonomy as well as for
other sorts of privacy rights. Note, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models For
Illinois, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215, 275 (1989); Comment, Does the Illinois Cannabis Control
Act Violate the Right to Privacy Enunciated in the Illinois Constitution?, 9 J. Marshall
J. of Prac. & Proc. 280, 290 (1975).
In Hawaii, the first attempt to protect rights of autonomy privacy under the state
constitution, the 1968 amendment cited at supra note 55, was narrowly construed. The
state courts rejected claims that that provision protected privacy rights. See, e.g., State
v. Rocker, 52 Haw. 336, 475 P.2d 684 (1970) (nude sunbathing). In Hawaii, however,
the constitutional framers and the people reacted directly, without waiting for the state
courts to reverse their initial narrow interpretation. In direct response to the narrow
construction given the privacy guarantee of the 1968 constitution, Hawaii's 1978 consti-
tutional convention proposed and the voters ratified a second, freestanding state consti-
tutional guarantee of privacy. Haw. Const. art. I, § 6. This time, the framers made clear
their intention to protect "autonomy" rights, as those had been defined in federal caselaw.
State v. Mueller, 66 Haw. 616, 671 P.2d 1351 (1983) (quoting the Report of the Convention
sitting as a committee of the whole, adopting the committee report as the consensus of
the assembly, Comm. Whole Rep. No. 15, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
of Hawaii of 1978, Vol. I at 1024). The Hawaii courts have since then respected that
intention, interpreting section 6 to protect a wide variety of autonomy privacy interests.
State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 377-80 (1988) (finding state constitutional protection for in-
home possession of pornography); State v. Mueller, 66 Haw. 616, 671 P.2d 1351 (1983)
(noting that state constitution protects autonomy rights, but rejecting a claim that it
extends to discreet commercial sex). See generally, Note, supra note 59, at 241-44.
60. Louisiana Law Institute, The Projet of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana
(1950).
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working document.6' One of the proposed drafts for the Declaration of
Rights that the committee considered and debated, the draft prepared
by delegate and committee member Dr. Gerald Weiss, included a free-
standing guarantee of privacy that clearly would have included a right
of privacy in the "autonomy" sense of Griswold and its progeny. 62
Other drafts and proposals considered by the committee did not refer
to privacy at all. 63 The available records of the committee do not indicate
whether its members explicitly discussed the substantive scope of the
state guarantee of privacy, or whether it would include abortion rights
of the sort recognized in Roe. Nevertheless, it does appear that the
language finally adopted by the committee was intended to be a com-
promise between the competing drafts by Dr. Weiss and others, incor-
porating the substance of the broader Weiss proposal without the need
for a separate section."
61. Committee Document No. 23, reproduced in X Records: Committee Documents,
supra note 52, at 97-107.
62. Id. at 100-01. Section 5 of proposed draft of delegate Weiss would have provided
as follows:
§ 5. Right to Privacy
(A) Everyone has the right to privacy. No law shall authorize arbitrary or
abusive interference with one's private life, family, home or communications.
(B) No warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by affidavit
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
63. Id., reproducing the draft "search and seizure" articles drawn from the Projet,
and from the proposed drafts prepared by delegates Jenkins and Roy.
64. X Records: Committee Documents, supra note 52, at 10, 54-55, Minutes of the
meeting of the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections [hereinafter "Minutes"] of
April 17, 1990. As initially adopted by the committee, the provision read as follows:
Section _. Searches and Seizures
Every person shall be secure in his person, houses, papers, and other poss-
essions against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No
warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation
particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to be
seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely
affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this section shall have
standing to raise the illegality of that search or seizure in the appropriate court
of law. No law shall permit the interception or inspection of any private
communication or message. (emphasis added.)
Committee Document No. 28, "Tentative Preamble and Sections of a Rights Article for
the New Louisiana Constitution Adopted by the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections
of CC/73 as of April 17, 1973," id. at 55. The committee later modified this guarantee
in accord with staff suggestions. Committee Document No. 45, "Analysis of Second Draft
Proposal on the 'Declaration of Rights,"' reproduced at id. at 121-23; id. at 68, Minutes
of June 14, 1973.
The only source of the "privacy" language proposed to the committee on the day it
met and initially drafted this provision was the draft of Dr. Weiss. Since the term was
apparently drawn from his draft, it makes sense to conclude that it was intended to be
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In July 1973, the Louisiana Constitutional Convention reconvened
in plenary session to consider the drafts prepared by its various com-
mittees. 65 In late August, the convention took up the proposed Decla-
ration of Rights. On August 31 it debated and passed section 5, the
privacy guarantee." Although comments made a few days later on
another subject indicate that the delegates were aware of the substance
of the then recent decisions in Roe and Doe,67 the plenary debate on
section 5 focused almost exclusively on the last sentence of the proposed
guarantee, which would grant standing to raise the illegality of a search
to any person adversely affected thereby." There was little discussion
understood in the same way as it was intended to have been understood in his draft.
The actual form of the compromise language for the search and seizure (privacy) guarantee
adopted by the committee was quite similar to and may have been modeled after like
guarantees in the Illinois and Hawaii constitutions. See supra notes 54 and 55.
65. The proposals of the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections regarding a state
Declaration of Rights were presented to the full convention as Committee Proposal No.
2. 1 Official Journal, supra note 50, at 85-88, 1lth Days Proceedings, July 6, 1973. The
official "Comment" to section 5 made no mention of the right "privacy" in its autonomy
sense:
Comment: The 1921 provisions have been changed to stress that communications
and property are included in the right to privacy. A search warrant is to include
the lawful purpose or reason for the search. In addition, persons protected
against illegal searches and seizures include not only the person whose house
or property has been illegally searched but also any other person adversely
affected by the illegal search.
Id. at 86. Later, after further amendment, the committee presented a substitute which
was read and submitted as Committee Proposal No. 25. The substitute was adopted and
ordered engrossed and passed to its third reading. 1 Official Journal, supra note 50, at
357-58, 34th Days Proceedings, August 22, 1973.
66. I Official Journal, supra note 50, at 420-21, 40th Days Proceedings, August 31,
1973. As introduced and passed, the proposal read as follows:
Section 5. Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communi-
cations, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures or
invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation particularly describing the place to be searched, the
persons or thingg to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search.
Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of
this Section shall have standing to raise the illegality of this search or seizure
in the appropriate court of law.
67. Brief references to abortion were made during the later debate on section 20 of
the proposed Declaration of Rights, which would preclude euthanasia as well as "cruel,
unusual or excessive punishments." Some of the comments made reference to the "law"
that a six month old fetus is considered viable and a legal "person." These comments
appear to be a slightly garbled reference to the trimester analysis of Roe. VII Records
of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, 1190-92
(1977) [hereinafter "Records: Convention Transcripts"], 44th Days Proceedings, September
8, 1973, especially the comments of delegates Fontenot, Roy, Lanier & Jenkins.
68. VI Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 67, at 1072-77, 34th Days Pro-
ceedings, April 7, 1973. The specific issues raised in the debate included whether this
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of the substantive scope of the express guarantee of "privacy" and no
discussion at all concerning autonomy rights in general, or of abortion
rights in particular. 69
After final technical amendment by the Committee on Style and
Drafting,70 the proposed constitution-including the privacy guarantee
of section 5-was finally passed by the convention and presented to the
voters for ratification. The issues of whether the state constitution did
or should provide expanded privacy rights and, if so, how those rights
would be defined, apparently played no part in the ratification debate.
Neither contemporary newspaper accounts and editorials7 nor voter
materials prepared and distributed by such organizations as the Public
Affairs Research Council, 72 made any reference to abortion rights what-
sentence would grant a private right of action against officers, whether it would apply
to private infringers, and whether it would hamper law enforcement. A motion to delete
the last sentence was defeated by the convention. Id. at 1077.
69. Id. at 1072-77. The only comment that appears to have touched on these issues
was that of delegate Vick, introducing this section on behalf of the committee. He described
the overall purpose of the guarantee in broad terms which could be interpreted as referring
to, among other things, autonomy rights of the sort recognized by the federal Supreme
Court in Griswold and Roe:
[O]ne of the geniuses responsible for our Federal Constitution and the Bill of
Rights said that "there is a circle around every individual human being which
no government ought to be permitted to overstep, that there is, or ought to
be, some space in human existence thus entrenched around and sacred from
authoritarian intrusion."
Id. at 1072. The same delegate described the proposed new privacy section as being "very
very similar to" both the federal Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provisions
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. Nevertheless, the comments made in debate do
show that the convention understood that the state privacy guarantee would grant rights
beyond those provided by the federal Constitution. See, e.g.,' colloquy of delegates Lanier
and Vick, id. at 1073.
70. II Official Journal, supra note 50, at 1155 (1973), 114th Days Proceedings, January
10, 1974. These stylistic amendments put section into its final form, as quoted at supra
note 48. They were not intended to make any substantive change and were adopted by
the convention without objection. IX Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 67, at
3552, 114th Days Proceedings, January 10, 1974.
71. Review of the New Orleans Times-Picayune, the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate
and State-Times and the Shreveport Times during the period of the ratification campaign
for the new constitution, i.e. from January 20, 1974 through April 20, 1974, reveals no
article, editorial or letter to the editor either attacking or defending the proposed con-
stitution based upon the protection or lack of protection which it would extend to autonomy
rights in general or abortion rights in particular.
72. The explanatory materials available to voters generally praised the proposed new
constitution for having expanded the generally heightened protection for individual rights
contained in its Declaration of Rights, noting that in many respects those protections
should and did go beyond the protections available under the federal Bill of Rights. See,
e.g., Public Affairs Research Council, Philosophies in the Proposed Constitution 11-12
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soever. Relatively few voters chose to vote on the proposed charter and
only a slim majority of those who voted cast their ballots in its favor.7
Nevertheless, the new constitution was duly ratified and entered into
force as of midnight, December 31, 1974. 74
C. Interpreting the Guarantee: Constitutional Privacy in the
Louisiana Courts
Since 1974, Louisiana courts have interpreted the "privacy" guar-
antee of section 5 of the state constitution to incorporate and protect
a wide range of individual interests. By far the most common use that
has been made of this provision has been in the area of search and
seizure rights, where it has been interpreted to grant protections against
arbitrary arrest and against unreasonable searches and seizures that are
similar to, but that go beyond, the protections offered by the Fourth
Amendment to the federal Constitution.7 In two less common, but no
less important, series of cases, courts have also relied on section 5 as
a textual source for vindicating rights against invasion of privacy in the
tort senses of the term, 76 and for protection against unreasonable com-
pilation or disclosure of information about individuals.7
(1974).
To the extent to which such materials made reference to the privacy guarantee of the
proposed constitution at all, they referred only to interests in "informational" privacy
and to the heightened protection it would provide against illegal searches and seizures.
See, e.g., Public Affairs Research Council, PAR's Voter's Guide to the 1974 Proposed
Constitution 3 (1974) explaining the "highlights" of the proposed Declaration of Rights.
The comment on the privacy guarantee, quoted in full, stated only that the proposal
would, "[m]odify present restrictions on illegal searches and seizures to include com-
munications, and provide that any person adversely affected by an illegal search or seizure
would have standing to raise the illegality of the search in court."
73. On the relative apathy of the voters toward the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
see generally Public Affairs Research Council, Special Election on the Constitution-April
20, 1974 (1974), reprinted in condensed form in Readings in Louisiana Politics 508 (M.
Carleton, P. Howard & J. Parker, eds. 1975); Carleton, The Louisiana Constitution of
1974, in Louisiana Politics: Festival in a Labyrinth 15 (J. Bolner, ed. 1982).
74. La. Const. art. XIV, § 35.
75. See, e.g., State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989) (holding that DWI road-
blocks, though permissible under the search and seizure provisions of the federal fourth
amendment, nonetheless violate the more stringent requirements of the state constitutional
guarantee of privacy, La. Const. art. I, § 5); State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385
(La. 1982) (and cases cited, treating federal precedent as persuasive, but holding warrantless
search violative of the more stringent requirements of the state constitution's affirmative
guarantee of privacy); State v. Kinneman, 337 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976) (same).
76. As is noted at supra note 20, the Louisiana law of privacy in its sense as a
private tort predated enactment of section 5, and is rooted primarily in Civil Code art.
2315. Since 1974, however, courts have also looked to section 5 as additional textual
support for the proposition that invasion of privacy constitutes an actionable tort in this
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Though reference was occasionally made to state constitutional rights
of privacy in the autonomy sense,78 Louisiana courts had, until recently,
no occasion to consider whether the state constitutional guarantee also
protected rights of that type. Finally, however, in last term's decision
in Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 79 the Louisiana Supreme Court squarely
held that the state constitutional right of privacy also incorporates and
independently protects autonomy-type privacy rights from unreasonable
legislative interference. In Hondroulis, the court explicitly recognized
that the federal constitutional "right of personal privacy includes 'the
interest in independence in making certain decisions,"' ° including, though
not limited to, "personal decisions 'relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships and child rearing and education."'' s
The court further interpreted the privacy guarantee of article 1, section
5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 as having been "intended to
establish an affirmative right to privacy impacting non-criminal areas
of law and establishing the principles of [those federal] Supreme Court
decisions in explicit statement instead of depending on analogical de-
velopment." 82 On the merits of the specific case before it, the Hondroulis
court noted that several other states have interpreted the decision to
obtain or reject medical treatment as falling within the express or implied
guarantees of autonomy privacy of their respective state constitutions,
and concluded that section 5 should likewise be read to include and
protect such rights.83
state. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enterprises, 530 So. 2d 643, 647 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1988); Parish Nat'l Bank v. Lane, 397 So. 2d 1282, 1286 (La. 1981); Roshto v.
Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 430 (La. 1983); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So.
2d 1386, 1387-89 n.2 (La. 1979).
77. See, e.g., Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294, 300 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
78. See, e.g., Arsenaux v. Arsenaux, 428 So. 2d 427 (La. 1983), indicating that rights
of autonomy privacy incorporated within section 5 provided additional support for its
holding that testimony regarding a wife's abortion fell within the physician-patient privilege
and was inadmissable.
79. 546 So. 2d 466, 475-77 (La. 1989), holding that, in order to avoid conflict with
the state constitutional right of patients to choose to reject or obtain medical treatment
freely, without undue government interference, consent forms signed pursuant to
La.R.S.40:1299.40 could not be interpreted to create an irrebuttable presumption of
informed consent. The case is noted and the non-constitutional aspects of the decision
are discussed at Note, Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher: The Crusade Back to Canterbury, 50
La. L. Rev. 1195 (1990). See generally Devlin, Developments in the Law-Louisiana
Constitutional Law, 51 La. L. Rev. 295, 297-304 (1990).
80. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 546 So. 2d 466, 472 (La. 1989) (quoting Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 97 S. Ct. 869, 876 (1977)).
81. Id. at 472 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726
(1974) (citations omitted)).
82. Id. at 473.
83. Id. at 472-74.
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Though some objections could be raised,8 the basic point made by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hondroulis-that section 5 should be
interpreted to incorporate and protect autonomy rights as well as other
types of privacy interests-is well founded. As noted above, the drafting
history of the privacy guarantee of the state constitution supports such
a reading."' Moreover, while the bulk of section 5 relates primarily to
the criminal procedural aspects of search and seizure, the placement of
this whole section in the first part of the Declaration of Rights, apart
from the other criminal procedural guarantees, further indicates the
framers' intentions to extend its protections to such non-criminal areas
of privacy law.8 6 Secondary sources contemporaneous with the drafting
of the 1974 constitution also stressed that the state privacy guarantee
was intended by its drafters to be interpreted broadly in order to protect
a wide range of individual interests in disclosural and autonomy privacy.8 7
Finally, the court's result in Hondroulis can be defended on the
basis of standard methods of objective analysis of the state constitutional
text and, in particular, the meaning of the word "privacy." The Louis-
iana Supreme Court has, like other courts, often resolved difficult issues
of state constitutional interpretation by treating the crucial language in
the document as "a term of art or technical term" which must be
"interpreted according to its received meaning and acceptation with those
84. One potentially troubling objection could be based upon the similarity in language
between section 5 of the Louisiana constitution and the parallel privacy provisions of the
Hawaii and Illinois constitutions, parallel provisions that were not understood, in 1974,
as applying to autonomy privacy interests. See supra note 59. However, while the texts
of the Hawaii and Illinois privacy guarantees were presented to the Louisiana Committee
on Bill of Rights and Elections, there is no indication in the record that that committee
ever received any information regarding how they had been interpreted on this point.
There is thus no reason to conclude that the decision of the Louisiana drafting committee
to write its privacy provision in a form similar to that the Hawaii and Illinois constitutions
reflects any decision to incorporate the narrow constructions which those provisions received
at that time. On the contrary, there is every reason to conclude, as did the court in
Hondroulis, that the Louisiana framers' understanding of the concept of constitutional
"privacy" was based instead on the much more widely publicized federal cases defining
that term to include autonomy rights in the Griswold sense.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 51-69.
86. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1974).
87. Id., at 20-21, explaining the purpose of section 5 as "accelerating the tentative
steps of Griswold" and tracing the origin of its "invasions of privacy" language to
"Griswold's establishment of a right of privacy and to fear of unrestrained gathering and
dissemination of information on individuals through use of computer data banks." See
also, Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 9, 28 (1975), explaining the
same language as "intended to give the courts wide latitude in invalidating state laws




learned in the field. .. ."" By 1973, ".privacy" had certainly become
a "term of art" in the field of constitutional law, thus providing the
premise for this cannon of construction. Though I have elsewhere crit-
icized the Louisiana courts' use of this doctrine as a mechanical approach
to constitutional interpretation in cases where the drafters were in fact
unlikely to have been consciously aware of the supposed "technical"
meaning of their words, 89 the argument certainly has validity in situations
such as this, where the timing and notoriety of the decisions defining
the relevant term make it much more likely that the drafters of the
state constitution understood the import of the language they chose.
Nonetheless, while the conclusion that section 5 was intended to
protect some sort of autonomy rights appears strong, the fact remains
that no Louisiana court to date has squarely held that this provision
has any relevance to the issue of abortion. Determining whether the
protections embodied in article I, section 5 extends to the abortion issue
requires further analysis.
II. INTERPRETING THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
"PRIVACY": SHOULD IT BE INTERPRETED TO PROTECT ABORTION
RIGHTS AT ALL?
Assume that the Louisiana legislature passes, and the governor signs,
a statute criminalizing abortions except in narrow circumstances. Such
a bill would clearly limit a woman's ability to obtain an abortion in
this state in a manner violative of the federal constitutional rights
announced in Roe and Doe.90 Assume further that the statute is chal-
lenged in state court as violative of the state constitutional guarantee
of autonomy privacy recognized in Hondroulis.91 The issue then will be
88. State Bond Comm'n v. All Taxpayers, et al., 510 So. 2d 662, 665 (La. 1987)
(citing La. Civ. Code art. 15).
89. Devlin, Developments in the Law-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 1986-1987, 48
La. L. Rev. 335, 348-54 (1987).
90. The 'possibility is not farfetched. During the summer of 1990, the Louisiana
legislature passed several bills that would have forbidden all abortions except where
necessary to save the life of the mother or, in a later version, in limited circumstances
in cases of rape or incest. They were vetoed by the governor only because they did not,
in his view, give victims of rape or incest sufficient real opportunity to exercise the rights
the bill purported to grant. Abortion opponents plan to introduce similar bills in the
coming term. Whatever the scope of the special privileges that the legislature and governor
eventually agree to give rape and incest victims, it certainly appears that any such statute
would derogate from the scope of the abortion rights granted federal constitutional
protection in Roe and Doe.
91. As was briefly discussed at supra note 4, several federal Supreme Court justices
are on record as opposed to the principles or analysis of Roe. With the ascension of
Justice Souter it is possible, though by no means certain, that Roe will be overturned or
substantially modified on the federal level, leaving state constitutions as the only grounds
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whether that state right should extend to independently protect rights
of the type originally recognized in Roe and Doe-rights of pregnant
women to choose, without undue state interference, whether to end their
pregnancies through abortion. For the reasons set forth below, the
argument in favor of such an interpretation is strong. Nonetheless, in
light of the lack of evidence that the bulk of the convention delegates
or the ratifiers understood that the state constitution incorporated in-
dependent protection for such rights-indeed, considering the possibility
that any overt discussion of such issues might have doomed the proposed
constitution to rejection at the polls-acceptance of this interpretation
will require analysis of the merits of competing approaches to state
constitutional interpretation.
A. The Argument in Favor: Drafting History, Precedent and Terms
of Art
In light of the circumstances outlined in Part I of this article, the
arguments in favor of recognizing a state constitutional right to repro-
ductive choice are both straightforward and well grounded. The drafting
history of section 5, the few applicable Louisiana precedents, ordinary
rules of interpretation of constitutional texts and the decisions of sister
state courts facing similar issues, would all lead to a conclusion that
the guarantee of privacy in the Louisiana constitution does incorporate
and independently protect the right to choose an abortion, as that right
was understood in 1974.
In the first place, such a result appears to be supported by the
drafting history of the state constitution, which indicates that the Com-
mittee on Bill of Rights and Elections, at least, knew and intended that
their compromise draft would incorporate a broad range of autonomy
rights. 92 Such a result would also be consistent with the sparse precedents
interpreting the state constitutional guarantee of privacy. Louisiana courts
have on several occasions reiterated that section 5 should be interpreted
broadly to protect a broad range of citizens' interests in privacy. 93 More
on which such statutes may be challenged. In any event, even if Roe remains good law,
the Louisiana Supreme Court might well choose, as it did in Hondroulis, to analyze such
a statute under the state constitution instead of or in addition to analyzing it under the
federal constitution. See generally Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill
of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980), urging state courts to analyze constitutional
challenges first under their respective state constitutions.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 51-64.
93. See, e.g., Moresi v. State of Louisiana, Dep't of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So.
2d 1081 (La. 1990) (indicating that the protections of section 5 "go beyond limiting state
action," and holding that a violation of section 5 may give rise to a private cause of
action for damages); Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 546 So. 2d 466 (La. 1989); State v.
Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989) (holding that DWI roadblocks, though permissible
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specifically, in its only statement touching on the subject of abortion,
the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated in dictum eight years ago that
section 5 probably does provide some protection for reproductive pri-
vacy. 94 And surely nothing in the language or reasoning of Hondroulis
suggests that the state constitutional right of autonomy privacy recog-
nized in that case should not extend to abortion rights as well. On the
contrary, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hondroulis relied heavily on
and quoted extensively from Roe v. Wade to define the nature and
scope of the right of privacy incorporated into the state constitution.95
No apparent reason suggests that this reliance should stop short of
including within the meaning of "privacy" the specific rights that were
at stake in Roe.
Moreover, the textual argument that abortion rights should be in-
cluded within the meaning of constitutional "privacy," as that technical
term of art was understood in 1974, is much stronger than the parallel
argument regarding the right to individual decision making regarding
medical treatment impliedly accepted by the court in Hondroulis. As of
1974, when the state constitution was adopted, no case had yet squarely
held that the decision to accept or reject medical treatment fell within
the scope of constitutional autonomy privacy in the Griswold sense of
that term. 96 In contrast, the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Roe v. Wade, explicitly recognizing that abortion rights did fall within
the concept of constitutional privacy, was handed down on January 22,
under the search and seizure provisions of the federal Fourth Amendment, nonetheless
violate the more stringent requirements of the state constitutional guarantee of privacy,
La. Const. art. I, § 5); State v. Wood, 457 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984) (art. I,
§ 5 goes beyond federal constitution); State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982)
(same); Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294, 300 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (disclosural
rights).
94. Arsenaux v. Arsenaux, 428 So. 2d 427 (La. 1983), stating that the right of privacy
guaranteed by section 5 provided additional support for its holding that testimony regarding
a wife's abortion fell within the physician-patient privilege and was inadmissable in a
divorce suit.
95. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 546 So. 2d 466, 472-73 (La. 1989). The court's
choice of Roe as its principal source for interpretation of the concept of "privacy" is
fully in accord with the argument that the state constitution should be interpreted as that
"term of art" was generally understood by lawyers and informed citizens in 1973 and
1974. At the time when the state constitution was being drafted and ratified, Roe was
the most recent, and hence the most authoritative, case explaining the meaning of "privacy"
in its federal constitutional sense. It would thus be the source that lawyers and laymen
would then have looked to for definition of that term.
96. It appears that the first cases to find a constitutionally-based autonomy right to
refuse medical treatment were decided in 1976. Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 257,
239 N.W.2d 905, 910 (1976) (relying on the federal Constitution only); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J.10, 39-42, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922, 197 S. Ct. 319 (1976)
(relying on both federal and New Jersey state constitutions).
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1973-while the convention was meeting in its first plenary session,
months before the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections drafted
section 5, and several months before the convention reconvened in
plenary session to debate and adopt that language. It is therefore rea-
sonable to presume that the drafters of the Louisiana constitution were
or should have been aware of Roe and of its holding that the right of
"privacy" as defined under the federal Constitution included some pro-
tection for reproductive choice. 97 Thus, ordinary principles of consti-
tutional interpretation provide ample grounds to regard the decision of
the framers and ratifiers of the Louisiana Constitution to include "pri-
vacy" language in the state constitution as implicitly incorporating pro-
tection for reproductive rights, among others.
Such a reading of the state constitutional guarantee of privacy is
also in accord with the reading given by courts in other states to similar
privacy provisions in their own constitutions. For example, in its recent
decision in In Re T. W.,91 the Florida Supreme Court held that the
express guarantee of privacy in the Florida constitution99-a guarantee
which, like Louisiana's section 5, was derived from federal models and
adopted after Roe was decided-did indeed include and independently
protect women against undue state interference with a woman's decision
to obtain an abortion. As the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Ehrlich
pointed out, because "the privacy provision was added to the Florida
Constitution by amendment in 1980, well after the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade," it "can therefore be presumed
that the public was aware that the right to an abortion was included
97. Moreover, as is discussed at supra note 67, there is at least indirect indication
from the convention records that the members of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention
of 1973 were indeed aware of at least the broad outlines of Roe.
98. 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190-96 (Fla. 1989), striking down a statute requiring parental
consent to a minor's abortion as violative of the state constitution's express guarantee of
privacy, even though such restrictions would probably pass muster if challenged under
the federal constitution as interpreted in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035
(1979). Though the plurality opinion noted the origin of state constitutional protection
for abortion rights in federal law, it chose to address the issue solely under the express
privacy guarantee of the Florida constitution. Construing that state guarantee, the plurality
concluded that it does protect abortion rights, that those rights extend to minors, and
that regulations purporting to limit minors' abortion rights must be judged by a "strict
scrutiny" standard. Applying the strict state standard to the regulation at issue, the court
found that the state's interests were not "compelling," and that the means chosen to
obtain those ends were not the least restrictive available; other mechanisms that provided
greater procedural safeguards for minors' privacy interests were available.
99. Fla. Const. art. I, § 23 provides, "Every natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided
herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public
records and meetings as provided by law." This new section was proposed as an amendment
and ratified by the voters on November 4, 1980.
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under the federal constitutional right of privacy and would therefore
certainly be covered by the Florida privacy amendment.""' ° Fidelity to
that presumed understanding and intent thus required the court to hold
that the state guarantee extends to those general classes of rights, such
as the right to obtain an abortion, that were protected as a matter of
federal law at the time the state constitution was amended.' 0 Similar
results interpreting a state constitutional guarantee of abortion rights to
include and independently protect abortion rights have also been reached
by the highest courts of California' °2 and Massachusetts,0 3 among others.
B. The Argument Against: The Dog That Didn't Bark
Such arguments in favor of construing the Louisiana constitution
to provide independent protection for abortion rights may, however, be
subject to significant objection. For there is absolutely no evidence-in
the documents and minutes of the Committee on Bill of Rights and
Elections, in the transcripts of the plenary debates of the full convention,
in newspapers or in the other materials distributed to the voters during
100. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1197 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
101. Justices Overton and Grimes, each of whom concurred in part and dissented in
part, agreed with Chief Justice Ehrlich that the Florida privacy guarantee should be
understood as codifying the principles of Roe into the state constitution, and that any
future recession by the federal Supreme Court from those principles would not effect or
diminish the protection to be given to abortion rights in Florida. Id. at 1201-02 (Overton,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Grimes, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). However, both justices emphasized that when the state constitution was amended,
the United States Supreme Court had decided not only Roe v. Wade, but also Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979), which indicated that parental consent
requirements would be constitutional under the federal Constitution under some circum-
stances. Each argued that it was that understanding of abortion rights, Roe as modified
and limited by Bellotti, that was effectively adopted by the voters of Florida when the
state constitution was amended in 1980. Turning to the challenged statute, the justices
concluded that it was, or could be construed to be, consistent with the principles of
Bellotti. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1201-04.
Since the Louisiana constitution was enacted in the immediate aftermath of Roe, before
any further decisions were rendered, similar problems do not arise in interpreting the
Louisiana privacy guarantee.
102. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that the express state constitutional right of autonomy privacy
'in Cal. Const. art. I, § 1, precluded the state from interfering with indigent women's
decisions to abor by funding births while withholding funds for abortions); American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1989)
(parental consent statute held unconstitutional).
103. Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387, 397-404 (1981),
like the California decision in Myers, holding that refusal of state authorities to fund
abortions for indigent women violated the state constitution's penumbral guarantee of




the ratification campaign-of any recognition or explicit discussion by
anyone of the possibility that section 5 might be construed to indepen-
dently protect any rights to reproductive autonomy in general or to
abortions in particular. While this lack of discussion can doubtless be
explained to some extent on the basis of historical factors,3 4 it is
nonetheless difficult to conceive-if the framers did indeed intend to
grant such rights, or if the ratifying public understood that the new
constitution would do so-that such an emotional issue would have
aroused no debate at all. Like the silence of Sherlock Holmes' dog that
did not bark, 105 this lack of debate may speak volumes. The inescapable
conclusion appears to be that the Louisiana Constitutional Convention
as a body and the voters as a whole did not consider the question of
whether the general right of privacy they adopted would provide in-
dependent protection of abortion rights, particularly in the then unfo-
reseeable event that federal protection of such rights might weaken or
cease in the future. 106 Indeed there is, if anything, some reason to suppose
104. Three possible historical reasons for such silence come to mind. First, proponents
of the new constitution had every incentive to avoid divisive issues and would have tended
to soft pedal such questions. Second, it appears that organized opposition to abortion
rights had not by 1974 reached the pitch of intensity it achieved thereafter, thus further
tending to mute debate. Finally, and I suspect most importantly, the tendency at the time
was to see such issues of human rights as essentially "federal" issues governed by the
United States Constitution and courts, to which the state constitution was simply not
relevant. It was only after the mid 1970's that the "new federalism" revolution in state
constitutional interpretation, which caused state constitutions once again to be regarded
as primary guarantors of individual rights, gathered any significant following or popular
recognition.
105. "Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.
A. Conan Doyle, "Silver Blaze," in I Sherlock Holmes: The Complete Novels and Stories,
455, 472 (Bantam Classic ed. 1986). From the failure of the watchdog to bark, Holmes
deduced that the person who stole the racehorse, "Silver Blaze," was no stranger to the
dog, or to the missing horse.
106. An alternative approach to this problem of lack of discussion or conscious intent
regarding abortion may be found through a kind of "agency" theory of constitutional
drafting. Briefly, it could be argued that the Louisiana electorate delegated a significant
portion of their constitution-making power to their elected delegates to the Constitutional
Convention of 1973, reserving only their power to reject the work of their agents. According
to ordinary principles of agency law, principals who ratify the acts of their agents are
bound thereby, even if the principals are not consciously aware of all of the implications
of the agents' acts. A similar argument could also be raised with respect to the convention's
"sub-delegation" of primary drafting responsibility to the various committees into which
the delegates resolved themselves. Like the electorate, the full convention reserved to itself
the power to ratify the work of its agents, the committees, and could be considered
bound by that ratification even if many members of the convention were not consciously
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that if the people had been fully informed that the proposed state
constitution would limit the ability of the legislature to outlaw abortions,
it would not have passed. 0 7
The hard questions are therefore whether and, if so, how this lack
of conscious understanding and intent on the part of the framers or
ratifiers should modify the otherwise compelling argument that the state
constitution's guarantee of privacy should be interpreted to incorporate
and protect abortion rights. To be sure, one cannot claim that state
constitutions generally only apply to those particular matters actually
considered, debated or subjectively intended by its framers and ratifiers.
Such a subjective view of "intent"-one that would apply constitutional
prohibitions only in those circumstances that were specifically foreseen
by the framers or ratifiers-has been repeatedly and correctly rejected
by courts'0° and commentators.' °9 Rather, the interpretive problem posed
by the lack of demonstrable public understanding of the state consti-
tutional guarantee of "privacy" results from our common constitutional
theories of how and why constitutional guarantees limit the otherwise
plenary power of a state legislature.
aware of the full implications of constitutional "privacy" in 1974.
For the reasons set forth below, the issue of interpretation of article I, section 5 need
not depend on this kind of "agency" analysis; other arguments, including those drawn
from the "interpretive intent" of the constitution's drafters, appear to be sufficient to
justify interpreting the state constitution to protect at least some degree of abortion rights.
However, it is worth noting that many aspects of the process which resulted in the 1974
constitution-particularly the election of most delegates from individual districts, provisions
for drafting committees, and provisions for a ratification election, all of which were
specifically provided for in the statute which called the convention-appear to support
this interpretation.
107. As was noted at supra notes 73-74, the state constitution was opposed by many
powerful groups within the state and was ratified by only a slim majority of the voters.
It certainly seems likely that injection of additional controversial issues such as abortion
into the debate might well have tipped the balance against ratification.
108. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1702 (1985)
(because of technological change, attempts to interpret the fourteenth amendment solely
with respect to the practices of the time when it was adopted, "would be a mistaken
literalism"); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482 (1977)
("[T]he Framers were men who focused on the wrongs of that day but who intended
the Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which would far outlast the
specific abuses which gave it birth").
109. See generally, T. Cooley, supra note 14, at 68-70; Simien, It is a Constitution
We Are Expounding, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 67, 102-06 (1990) (and authorities cited).
Even the most noted defenders of "strict interpretation" and fidelity to "framers' intent"
reject this form of "subjective" originalism. See, e.g., R. Bork, The Tempting of America,




1. Ratifiers Intent and State Constitutional Interpretation
Approaches to constitutional interpretation must serve two related
but analytically separable functions. First, as a matter of pure linguistics,
any such theory must provide a workable approach to understanding
the constitutional text and reasonably convincing justifications for re-
solving issues of interpretation of obscure passages-it must, in other
words, provide a workable theory of the constitution's "meaning" as
a pure text. Second, and perhaps more important, any interpretive model
must provide theoretical justification for the limits that constitutional
provisions impose on the choices that can be made by future legislative
majorities or executive officers-it must, in other words, provide a
workable theory of the constitution's "bindingness" as a political act.
This latter function, though often overlooked or assumed, is also im-
portant. It is not enough for constitutional interpreters to argue why,
as an academic matter, one understanding of an ambiguous phrase should
be preferred to another. Rather, one must demonstrate why a particular
interpretation of the text, however derived, should be considered binding
upon political actors.
This latter function is not necessarily easy to achieve. It is a fun-
damental principle of constitutional law in Louisiana (as elsewhere) that
the state legislature derives from the people and wields original sovereign
powers. Thus, unlike the federal Congress, a state legislature is potentially
omnipotent, and may do anything not forbidden by the state or federal
constitutions. 10 Although the power of a state constitution to impose
substantive restraints upon the legislature is often taken as if it were
self evident, that power in fact rests, according to standard theories,
upon a prior presumption-a presumption that the original source of
political power, the people themselves acting in a state of heightened
political activity and awareness, chose in some meaningful sense to
restrict the freedom of their otherwise omnipotent agents by placing
110. This point has been frequently reiterated by Louisiana courts. See, e.g., Director
of La. Recovery Dist. v. Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384, 387 (La. 1988) (the state legislature
wields original sovereign power and may thus do anything not expressly forbidden by the
state (or federal) constitution); Board of Comm'rs v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 496
So. 2d 281, 286 (La. 1986) (same); Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So. 2d 704 (La. 1982) (same,
and cases cited). This principle is of great antiquity and continues to be accepted by
modern commentators as a first principle of state constitutional interpretation. See, e.g.,
T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative
Power of the States of the American Union, 106-10 (4th ed. 1878); Williams, State
Constitutional Law Processes, 24 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 169, 178-79 (1983). The hard
part, of course, lies in determining whether a particular constitutional provision does or
does not apply to a particular legislative or executive action. See generally, Devlin,
Developments in the Law, 1986-87-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 48 La. L. Rev. 335
(1987).
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upon them the particular restraints embodied in a particular constitu-
tion.I'I Though such presumptions may be difficult to justify- as a matter
of historical fact, they remain the standard ground on which courts rely
to justify their power to declare an act of the political arms of gov-
ernment invalid.
This then is the problem. Purely textual or inferential arguments
about the derivation or technical meaning of words such as "privacy"
may be quite compelling as theories of meaning. But it may be argued
that in the context of state constitutional interpretation they may not,
standing alone, be sufficient to provide a foundation for the courts'
power to declare an act of the legislature trenching on abortion rights
unconstitutional. 112 As was noted above, there is little historical reason
to suppose that in 1974 the people of Louisiana had any conscious
intent to bind their legislature regarding the abortion issue. It is therefore
not obvious how a court can, except by resort to legal fiction, rely on
that non-existent political act, standing alone, as authority to prevent
the legislature from interfering with abortion rights. Some additional
argument may be required to justify the courts' authority to enforce
this correct but somewhat technical understanding of the state consti-
tution's guarantee of "privacy" against the otherwise plenary power of
the legislature to determine issues of public policy. For that, one must
return to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention and ask how the
drafters and ratifiers of the 1974 constitution intended that document
to be interpreted.
2. Original Interpretive Intent and the Louisiana Constitution
As commentators on the federal constitution have pointed out, those
who would be true to the original intentions of the framers of a
111. This point has been most frequently made with respect to the federal Constitution,
see, e.g., Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. 1013,
1049 (1984), but applies to state constitutions as well.
112. An interesting and potentially meaningful contrast can be drawn in this regard
between an interpretation of the section 5 which would disable the legislature from enacting
strict anti-abortion regulations and other cases where the Louisiana Supreme Court has
relied on close textual analysis and the "technical" meanings of words to interpret the
state constitution. In cases such as State Bond Comm'n v. All Taxpayers, 510 So. 2d
662 (La. 1987) (construing the term "debt" in La. Const. art. VII, § 6) and American
Lung Ass'n v. State Mineral Bd., 507 So. 2d 184 (La. 1987) (construing the term "sold"
in La. Const. art IX, § 4), where the court has interpreted the state constitution by
explicit or implicit resort to such extrinsic sources of definition and presumptions regarding
the drafters' understanding of the nuances of the relevant terms, the result of the court's
analysis has been to empower the legislature by narrowly construing a purported consti-
tutional limitation on the legislature's power. It could be argued that such techniques are
less appropriate when the result is to impose restraints on the legislature; that, in other
words, proponents of restraints on the political bodies of the state must show some level
of conscious understanding on the part of the framers and ratifiers that such restraints
are in fact being imposed. But see infra text accompanying notes 113-22.
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constitution must take into account not only the framers' understandings
of particular substantive constitutional provisions; they must also con-
sider and respect the framers expectations regarding the methods by
which that constitution would be interpreted in the future."' Indeed,
since it is clear that the drafters of the Louisiana constitution had certain
expectations regarding how their words would be understood and in-
terpreted by others, and that those expectations clearly did influence
their choice of language," 4 it is only by attempting to understand their
original interpretive intent that we can hope to understand correctly how
the state constitution should operate. Fortunately, while the issue of the
original interpretive intent of the drafters of the federal Constitution is
a matter of intense academic debate, the question of how the drafters
of the Louisiana state constitution expected their handiwork to be in-
terpreted is somewhat easier to answer.
Since Marbury v. Madison,"5 it has been a standard tenet of Amer-
ican constitutional law, state and federal, that courts are the final arbiters
113. Again this point has been made most clearly by commentators on the federal
Constitution. Compare, for example, Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective,
54 Go. Wash. L. Rev. 296, 308-15 (1986) (arguing that the framers of the federal
Constitution of 1787 intended that the document be interpreted according to their sub-
stantive "original intent"), with Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 902-13 (1985) (arguing that the framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution intended that its substantive provisions be interpreted according to its text,
without reference to extra.textual indicia of the framers' intentions). While the commen-
tators disagree as to what the framers' original intent was, they do agree that the framers'
interpretive intent-that is, their understanding of how future judges should approach the
task of construing their words-should guide those future judges in their task.
114. It is certainly clear that the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections was well
aware of the fact that their work product would be construed by courts in the future,
and acted accordingly. See, e.g., Committee Document No. 39, "Judicial Construction
of the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution," presented May 14, 1973 at p. 5 (discussing how certain language in the proposed
state speech guarantee might be construed by courts and how the Committee might modify
its language in order to make particular results more likely); Committee Document No.
44, "Comments to Proposed Sections" by Lee Hargrave, presented June 1, 1973 (discussing
the use made by Louisiana courts of "interpretive comments" to the Civil Code and
predicting how courts might use, or refuse to use, similar comments to the new consti-
tution); Committee Document No. 46, "Comments and observations on the first working
draft of the Declaration of Rights," presented June 7, 1973 at p. 2 (discussing possible
judicial construction of draft language of Art. I, § 3).
It is equally clear that the full Convention also expected the courts to take an active
role in interpreting the new constitution, and chose its language with one eye cocked to
influence that future interpretation. See discussion at infra note 118.
115. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), establishing the principle that the United States
Supreme Court possessed the authority to bindingly interpret the federal Constitution.
Similar authority had previously been asserted by state courts to interpret state constitutions.
See, e.g., Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Consti-
tutional Theory in the States, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1166, 1167 (1972), and cases cited.
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of what a constitution "means." It has become equally well understood
that in fulfilling this function, courts may and do read certain consti-
tutional terms broadly, as expressions of basic principles which should
be applied not only to the particular issues and controversies with which
the constitution's framers and ratifiers were familiar, but also to other
similar issues with which they may not have been familiar or which
they did not consider. Though justices and commentators differ as to
whether such approaches are appropriate in particular instances, most
agree that they should be used to some extent, in at least some cases.11 6
By 1973, the courts of Louisiana had embraced these principles and
interpreted various provisions of the prior state constitution in ways that
were true to its underlying principles but clearly beyond the specific
conceptions of its framers."17
116. Even some of the best known proponents of strict "originalist" approaches to
constitutional interpretation acknowledge that this form of judicial creativity can be
appropriate, at least in some cases. See, e.g., Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Con-
stitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693, 694 (1976) ("Merely because a particular activity may not
have existed when the Constitution was adopted, or because the framers could not have
conceived of a particular method of transacting affairs, cannot mean that general language
in the Constitution may not be applied to such a course of conduct").
117. Though Louisiana courts have not often articulated such principles overtly, many
examples can be found where the courts did interpret various provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1921 as applying to particular circumstances which were almost certainly
not consciously considered by the drafters or ratifiers of the 1921 constitution or its
amendments. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 244 La. 1039, 156 So. 2d 431 (1963) (construing
article IV, § 2 of the 1921 Constitution, which prohibits transfer of mineral rights owned
by the state, to apply to a warrant issued as replacement for a defective patent); Public
Housing Admin. v. Housing Auth. of Bogalusa, 242 La. 519, 137 So. 2d 315 (1961)
(construing article IV, § 12 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, which prohibited the
state from engaging in private enterprise, applied to also prevent a state agency from
purchasing insurance through a non-assessable policy issued by a mutual insurance com-
pany).
This doctrine was by 1974 equally established as a guiding principle of federal consti-
tutional interpretation, and had been applied in cases with which the delegates to the
Louisiana constitution were likely familiar. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 61 S. Ct. 1031 (1941), ruling certain Louisiana practices governing primary elections
for representatives to the United States Congress unconstitutional. As the Court in Classic
remarked:
But we are now concerned with the question whether the right to choose at a
primary election, a candidate for election as representative, is embraced in the
right to choose representatives secured by Article I, sec. 2. We may assume
that the framers of the Constitution in adopting that section, did not have
specifically in mind the selection and elimination of candidates for Congress by
the direct primary any more than they contemplated the application of the
commerce clause to interstate telephone, telegraph and wireless communication
which are concededly within it. But in determining whether a provision of the
Constitution applies to a new subject matter, it is of little significance that it
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The records of the debates of the Louisiana Constitutional Con-
vention show that the delegates, many of whom were attorneys, were
well aware of this tradition of judicial interpretation of generally phrased
constitutional provisions, and that they knew and intended that at least
some provisions of the new Louisiana constitution should be construed
by the Louisiana courts in just such a creative and expansive fashion."'
is one with which the framers were not familiar.
Classic, 313 U.S. at 315-16, 61 S. Ct. at 1038. It may be argued, in response, that since
state constitutions can be far more easily amended than can the federal Constitution,
there is correspondingly far less need to interpret state constitutional provisions broadly,
in the Classic manner. However, as the cases noted above demonstrate, Louisiana courts
have never refrained from applying the logic of state constitutional provisions to situations
not contemplated by the framers. Moreover, the constitution of 1974 requires, if anything,
a somewhat greater willingness to interpret its provisions not merely as commands directed
to specific situations but as statements of general principle which courts may apply to
novel situations. One aim of the drafters of the 1974 constitution was to reduce its bulk
by, among other things, substituting general provisions for multiple detailed precursors.
See L. Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 17 (1991), com-
paring the 30,000 words of the 1974 constitution to the ultimate 250,000 words of its
1921 predecessor. If the state constitution is to provide an effective check on the political
branches, the state courts will have to be willing to interpret the new constitution's general
phrases fairly, as principles which can be applied to new situations.
118. The transcripts of the debates at the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973
demonstrate that the delegates were well aware of the prevailing judicial precedents that
future courts would rely upon in interpreting that constitution. The total number of such
references are too many to reproduce, but a few examples may suffice to give the flavor.
See, e.g., VI Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 67, at 992, 37th day's pro-
ceedings, August 28, 1973 (comments of delegates Jenkins and Jackson, indicating that
whatever the convention might wish, judicial precedents had already established that the
constitution's preamble would not be construed as legally binding substantive law); id. at
1002, 38th day's proceedings, August 29, 1973 (comments of delegate Pugh that the
specific language guaranteeing that due process be afforded before a deprivation was
unnecessary in light of judicial precedents which had already established the point); id.
at 1004, 38th day's proceedings, August 29, 1973 (comments of delegate Thistlethwaite
that the phrase "just and adequate compensation" did not need explicit definition since
it had already been well defined and tested by the courts); id. at 1020, 1027, 38th day's
proceedings, August 29, 1973 (comments of delegates Burson, Pugh, and Lanier, referring
to prior federal caselaw as providing the operative definition of phrases such as "equal
protection" and "unreasonable discrimination"); id. at 1030, 1036, 39th day's proceedings,
August 30, 1973 (remarks of delegate Jenkins, referring to the phrase "police power" as
a legal "term of art" that would be construed by reference to judicial precedent). Where
the delegates disagreed with prior judicial precedents, they adopted specific language
intended to overturn those precedents. See, e.g., id. at 1003, 1011-12, 38th day's pro-
ceedings, August 29, 1973 (remarks of delegate Avant in favor of including specific
language insuring that the question of whether a "taking" of property was for a "public
purpose" would always be open to judicial determination, in order to overturn Louisiana
precedents holding that the legislature could foreclose inquiry into this issue).
The transcripts make it equally clear that the delegates understood and intended that
the state Bill of Rights would and should be interpreted expansively by Louisiana courts,
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Those records are full of colloquies to the effect that various provisions
of the state constitution would require significant judicial construction
before their meanings would be clarified. Delegates several times made
it clear that they did not know how certain proposed constitutional
language would be applied by the courts to various hypothetical situa-
tions, but that they were willing to leave some questions of interpretation
to future development by the courts. 19 This understanding extended to
article I, section 5. As to that provision too, it appears that the original
intention of the drafters of the state constitution was not that the state
courts would interpret the constitution in accordance with some pre-
existing fixed understanding on the part of the delegates as to what
they "intended," but rather that those courts would and should continue
to employ the standard techniques of interpretation in order to supply
a precise meaning that the drafters were unable to supply themselves.1 °
to guarantee Louisianians protection of rights that would extend beyond the protections
available under the federal Constitution. Again, a few examples will suffice. See, e.g.,
VI Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 67, at 989-90, 994, 37th day's proceedings,
August 28, 1973 (remarks of delegate Jackson); id. at 1000-01, 38th day's proceedings,
August 29, 1973 (remarks of delegate Vick, explaining the intent of the Committee on
Bill of Rights and Elections to include open ended and incompletely defined terms in the
Bill of Rights in order to leave open the possibility of expansive interpretations in the
future, interpretations that the delegates could not then foresee); id. at 1016-17, 38th
day's proceedings, August 29, 1973 (remarks of delegate Roy, indicating the committee's
intent to expand on restrictive federal interpretations of equal protection).
119. Again, a brief selection of passages should suffice to make the point. See, e.g.,
VI Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 67, at 1000-01, 38th day's proceedings,
August 29, 1973 (remarks of delegate Vick, particularly those reciting Judge Tate's advice
that the framers not try to limit the state Bill of Rights to their present concerns but
rather write it "for the future" as well); id. at 1004, 38th day's proceedings, August 29,
1973 (remarks of delegate Stagg, noting that "each word, each phrase, and yes, each
clause" of the new constitution will be "subjected to interpretation by the courts"); id.
at 1014, 38th day's proceedings, August 29, 1973 (remarks of delegate Roy, defending
the drafting committee's original decision to include broad "other rights" language in
the state "due process" guarantee as enabling future courts to define as "rights" some
activities now considered mere "privileges"); id. at 1016-17, 38th day's proceedings, August
29, 1973 (remarks of delegate Roy, noting that courts would have to decide what sorts
of distinctions were "reasonable," and thus not violations of the state equality guarantee,
on a case-by-case basis); id. at 1020-21, 38th day's proceedings, August 29, 1973 (remarks
of delegate Burson, noting that the federal courts had interpreted the federal equal
protection guarantee in ways that went beyond the understandings of its framers, and
advocating that the Louisiana constitution and courts should develop the meaning of the
state equality guarantee in a similarly "organic" fashion).
120. The full convention debate on section 5 focused almost entirely upon its last
sentence, which states that "any person" adversely affected will have standing to raise
the issue of the illegality of a search. Nevertheless, the comments of the delegates regarding
this section illustrate many of the same general themes and intentions-including .that
section 5 should be construed broadly, that federal precedents provided the background
law against which the state Declaration would be defined; and that the section was
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Moreover, while the understandings of the ratifiers are more difficult
to establish, no evidence appears to suggest that their understandings
were substantially different from those of the convention delegates.
For these reasons, the failure of the drafters and ratifiers of the
state constitution to engage in any express debate regarding whether its
guarantee of "privacy" would include abortion rights should not preclude
the state courts from concluding that it does, or from declaring un-
constitutional any state statute that derogates from the rights recognized
in Roe and Doe in 1973. There can be no doubt that the framers of
the state constitution possessed the power to limit the state legislature
in any way they saw fit including, among other techniques, by adopting
broadly worded provisions to which the courts would later give specific
content.12 1 The interpretive techniques that courts had employed land
would continue to employ in this endeavor, including the methods of
textual interpretation outlined in part A of this section, were well es-
tablished and known to the framers and ratifiers of the state constitution.
So long as state courts continue to use these methods to interpret these
broadly worded constitutional provisions, they will be doing what the
framers intended, even if they might reach results that the framers
themselves could not foresee.
In any event, alternative approaches that would restrict state con-
stitutional rights guarantees to the particular application that the ratifiers
had in mind at the time they acted would be unworkable. First, reliable
intended to liberalize pre-existing law-as characterized by the convention's discussion of
the Declaration of Rights generally. See, e.g., VI Records: Convention Transcripts, supra
note 67, at 1072, 40th day's proceedings, August 31, 1973 (remarks of delegate Vick,
introducing the section by quoting Thomas Jefferson's assertion "that there is a circle
around every human being which no government ought to be permitted to overstep, that
there is, or ought to be, some space in human existence thus entrenched around and
sacred from authoritarian intrusion."); id. at 1073, 40th day's proceedings, August 31,
1973 (colloquy of delegates Lanier and Vick, indicating that section 5 was intended to
adopt federal jurisprudence regarding the necessary specificity of warrants); id. at 1073,
40th day's proceedings, August 31, 1973 (colloquy of delegates Sandoz and Vick, that
section 5 was intended to "insert some additional rights" beyond those guaranteed by
the 1921 constitution); id. at 1075, 40th day's proceedings, August 31, 1973 (remarks of
delegate Warren that the purpose of the convention was to rewrite the old constitution
and "not stick to the old rules").
121. Although courts which rely on broadly worded costitutional provisions to overturn
legislation are often accused of usurping legislative powers, the analysis proposed here,
if accepted, would violate no doctrine of separation of powers. The people of Louisiana
are the ultimate source of all governmental powers, which they can freely delegate to any
branch or organ of government they see fit. If one accepts the argument that the drafters
and ratifiers expected and intended that the state courts would interpret the broadly
worded costitution of 1974 in accord with what were then well accepted techniques, and
that those expectations were thus implicitly made part of that constitution, then exercise
of those powers by the courts is no usurpation. On the contrary, courts which do so are
merely doing their duty and exercising powers which the people delegated to them.
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evidence of what precise applications the framers or ratifiers did or did
not "intend" would be impossible to obtain. And even putting aside
problems of proof, insuperable difficulties are posed by the probability
that framers and ratifiers simply did not consider, and thus had no
intentions regarding, most "hard questions" of constitutional interpre-
tation. Arguments relying on the ratifiers specific intentions thus really
amount to asking the hypothetical question of what the voters would
have done in the counterfactual situation that they had been asked to
decide the issue before the court. Such questions can never be answered
by anything better than a guess, and thus can never provide a sufficient
foundation for constitutional interpretation. 22
III. INTERPRETING THE LOUISIANA ABORTION RIGHT: QUESTIONS
ANSWERED AND UNANSWERED IN ROE AND DOE
Assuming that the Louisiana courts were to conclude, for the reasons
sketched in Part II above, that the state constitutional guarantee of
privacy incorporates and protects some sort of abortion rights against
legislative interference, questions would still remain as to how these state
constitutional abortion rights should be defined. This question has several
parts, three of which will be outlined briefly. First, courts will have to
determine what specific degree or kinds of abortion rights were rec-
ognized in or can be fairly inferred from Roe and Doe, and can thus
be deemed to have been incorporated into the state constitution when
it was adopted in 1974. Second, Louisiana courts will have to decide
whether the state constitution may be construed to include any abortion
rights beyond'those expressly or implicitly contained in Roe and Doe.
Third, courts interpreting section 5 of the state Declaration of Rights
will be required to determine whether and, if so, to what extent its
interpretation of the state constitutional right of "privacy" should be
affected by post-1974 federal decisions interpreting the implied federal
rights of reproductive autonomy. The final question-that of how, in
light of these points, the Louisiana courts should construe the state's
guarantee with regard to issues left open in 1974-is beyond the scope
of this article. Nevertheless, though each of these questions could well
each be the subject of a separate article, a few preliminary thoughts
on the first three issues may be usefully offered here. 23
122. It is interesting to note that, at the time when the state constitution was being
drafted and ratified, Louisiana appeared to be more or less evenly divided on the question
of whether abortions should be legalized. See, e.g., Sunday Advocate, Jan. 28, 1973, at
B3, col. 1, reporting the results of a poll showing that 460 of those Louisianans polled
in favor of legalization, 4507o opposed, and 90o undecided.
123. On the general issue of the interpretation of state constitutional rights derived
from federal sources, and the relevance of post-adoption federal precedent, see Devlin,
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A. The Adopted Minimum: What Reproductive Rights Were
Incorporated in 1974
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade
and Doe v. Bolton established certain basic principles regarding abortion
rights which, according to the arguments sketched above, can be pre-
sumed to have been incorporated into the Louisiana Constitution's ex-
press guarantee of privacy. Neither Roe nor Doe purported to rule that
any person enjoyed a general right to "abortion on demand," or that
the state does not have legitimate interests which may justify certain
restraints on how, when, and by whom abortions may be obtained.
12
However, those decisions did significantly limit the ability of states to
restrict abortions by recognizing only the asserted state interests "in
safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting
potential life"' 125 as of sufficient legitimacy and importance to justify
interference with a woman's decision whether to abort, and by holding
that even these interests could be relied upon to limit abortions only at
or after the point when they became "compelling." 126 This analysis
necessarily places significant limits on the extent and nature of operative
restraints which states can impose on a woman's choice to seek an
abortion. First, while subsequent cases may have cast some doubt on
the issue,1 27 Roe is explicit in its holding that a state may not override
a pregnant woman's rights in this area by the simple expedient of
declaring an embryo to be a "person" endowed with full legal rights.
2 1
Moreover, while Roe's "trimester" framework has been the subject of
much criticism in its details, 29 Roe and Doe nonetheless made clear that
the legitimacy of state imposed restrictions on abortions depend on both
the stage of pregnancy and the medical realities operative at that stage. 30
State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal Retrenchment: Some Thoughts
on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived. From Federal Sources, 3 Emerging Issues
St. Const. Law 173 (1990), from which 0 much of the material in parts "B" and "C" of
this section are derived.
124. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54, 93 S. Ct. 705, 727 (1973); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 189, 93 S. Ct. 739, 746 (1973).
125. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
126. Id. at 154-55, 163, 93 S. Ct. at 727-28, 731-32.
127. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3049-50,
(1989) (upholding Missouri abortion statute which in its preamble set forth "findings"
that the "life of each human being begins at conception," and that "unborn children
have protectable interests in life, health and well being"); Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2508-09 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting, arguing that the state's interest in protection of life is no less "compelling"
in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is later, when the fetus becomes viable).
128. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162, 93 S. Ct. at 731.
129. See, e.g., Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., with two other Justices
joining).
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-65, 93 S. Ct. 705, 732-33 (1973).
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Finally, restrictions allegedly based on a state's desire to maintain medical
standards must be legitimately connected to that end, and not mere
pretexts for discouraging abortion in general. 3'
While any exhaustive discussion of the precise holding and impli-
cations of Roe and Doe are beyond the scope of this article, it is worth
noting that those cases also provide clear answers to at least some of
the specific issues that have arisen with respect to abortion. For example,
those cases make clear that states may not discriminate against citizens
of other states who may seek abortions within their borders, 3 2 that
states may not completely prohibit abortions of non-viable fetuses,'33
and that, at least until the medical risks of abortions approach the risks
of live birth, the decision whether to abort must be left up to the
patient and her physician, exercising his best clinical judgment. 1' 4 More-
over, the cases make clear that the physician's clinical judgment regarding
the best interests of his pregnant patient cannot be unduly trammelled
by the state, either by restrictive statutory limitations on the circum-
stances which might justify an abortion, 3 ' or by procedural requirements
such as requiring concurrence by other physicians. 3 6 The woman's phy-
sician must remain free to consider all factors-including the patient's
age, her emotional, psychological and familial situation, as well as her
physical health-in reaching a decision. 3 7 On the other hand, Roe and
Doe make equally clear that certain restrictions, such as requiring that
abortions be performed only by physicians licensed to practice in the
state,' 3s and reasonable regulations and licensing procedures regarding
the facilities where such procedures may take place'39 will be permitted.
Despite the importance of their holdings, however, many important
questions regarding the availability of abortions were left undecided by
Roe and Doe. Among these were such issues as whether the state or
federal government could discriminate by providing funds for indigent
women seeking to give birth while withholding funds from indigents
seeking abortions, whether and to what extent the rights recognized in
those cases extend to pregnant minors, ,and whether parents, spouses or
other interested persons were entitled to be notified of or to participate
in a woman's decision to seek an abortion. While the United States
131. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192-99, 93 S. Ct. 739, 747-51 (1973) (discussing
various procedural restrictions on abortions).
132. Id. at 200, 93 S. Ct. at 751-52.
133. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64, 93 S. Ct. at 731-32.
134. Id. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 731-32.
135. Doe, 410 at 191-92, 93 S. Ct. at 747-48.
136. Id. at 195-99, 93 S. Ct. at 749-51.
137. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192, 93 S. Ct. 739, 747 (1973).
138. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165, 93 S. Ct. 705, 732-33 (1973).
139. Id. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 731-32.
[Vol. 51
ABORTION RIGHTS
Supreme Court has continued to wrestle with these issues, 140 and others,
none of the relevant cases in these areas were decided by 1974 and thus
none can be deemed to have been directly incorporated into the state
guarantee of privacy. As to these issues, important interpretive questions
remain: 1) whether the state courts are entitled to interpret the privacy
guarantee of section 5 to extend in any fashion beyond the specific
issues clearly dealt with in Roe and Doe; and 2) whether and to what
extent state courts should rely on the analyses and results of post-1974
federal cases as a guide to interpreting section 5 with respect to issues
left undecided in Roe and Doe.
B. Beyond the Adopted Minimum: May State Courts Go Beyond
Roe and Doe?
It may be argued that even if section 5 must be interpreted to
include abortion rights as they existed under Roe and Doe, there is still
no warrant for state courts to interpret the state constitutional guarantee
of privacy to extend beyond the particular holdings of those cases or
to provide any abortion rights not clearly articulated therein. While the
adoption of section 5 may be perhaps construed as an implicit adoption
of the construction actually put on that right by contemporaneous federal
cases, that act cannot necessarily be taken to imply any approval of or
desire to adopt subsequent developments in federal jurisprudence.'4 1 Thus,
it could be argued that the most that Louisiana's adoption of an express
right of privacy could be taken to have accomplished would be to have
"frozen" into the state constitution the federal law of constitutional
privacy as it existed in 1974, without creating any mandate for further
expansion or development of those rights by state courts interpreting
the state guarantee.
While this "freeze" approach may seem plausible as a way to limit
the courts' freedom to expand upon the implied "intentions" of the
framers and ratifiers, practical and theoretic problems make any strict
version of the "freeze" model inappropriate for interpretation of the
state constitution. For example, it would be impossible as a practical
matter for the Louisiana courts-even those which might attempt to
restrict their interpretation of section 5 in accordance with this ap-
proach-to arrive at any definite consensus regarding exactly what the
140. The major post-Roe federal abortion cases are listed and briefly annotated at
supra note 41.
141. But see Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988), holding that the 1983
amendment to the Florida constitution, which. explicitly tied interpretation of the state
constitution's search and seizure protections to federal interpretation of the Fourth Amend-




relevant federal precedents held, or how broadly or narrowly those
precedents should be interpreted. While Roe and Doe do clearly indicate
that some specific types of restrictions on abortions are clearly permissible
or impermissible, those cases are not and cannot be completely self
explanatory. Some questions-such as whether states may mandate par-
ticular procedures for determining fetal viability or require physicians
to provide certain information to patients seeking abortions-may or
may not be fairly encompassed within those cases. As to these issues,
there will always be uncertainty regarding what the people who adopted
that right understood the precedents to mean. 42 A fortiori, any state
court called upon to interpret section 5 with respect to issues such as
these simply cannot avoid at least a certain degree of "interpretation"
and "development" of those basic federal precedents.
Moreover, any approach that has the effect of "freezing" rights
poses significant theoretic difficulties. Any such attempt to restrict state
courts to the four corners of the pre-1974 federal cases both deprives
the state courts of their traditional functions of interpreting the law of
the state and adapting that law to changing social conditions, and ignores
basic structural and institutional differences between state and federal
law. As judges and commentators have pointed out, federalism concerns
and other institutional constraints often result in systematic underen-
forcement of federal rights. Since many of these institutional constraints
apply differently or not at all to state courts interpreting state rights,
there may be good reason to expect that a state constitutional right
might have somewhat different, presumptively broader and more pro-
tective, application than its federal cognate. 43 Any model that would
require strict adherence to federal precedent would necessarily prevent
the state courts from taking account of these differences in any mean-
ingful way.
For all these reasons, state courts cannot be precluded from at-
tempting to interpret section 5 and the federal cases on which it was
based in order to determine whether that section should apply to novel
issues not clearly dealt with in Roe and Doe. The final question concerns
how this process of interpretation should be pursued.
C. Independence in Interpretation: The Impact of Post-1974 Federal
Cases
At the outset, it should be noted that the issue of interpretation
presented with respect to section 5 is distinguishable from the more
142. See Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana Disaster, 63 Tex. L.
Rev. 1095, 1112-14 (1985).
143. See, e.g., Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the
Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959, 960-62 (1985); Williams,
In the Supreme Court's Shadow, supra note 7, at 389-402.
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common situation, where a state constitutional right was originally de-
rived from indigenous state sources. Most constitutional rights are of
this type. 44 In such cases, the argument that a state court should conform
its interpretation of a state provision to the federal Supreme Court's
interpretation of a parallel federal provision is relatively weak. 14 Nu-
merous state supreme courts, including Louisiana courts, have accord-
ingly held that arguments for conformity with federal interpretation
deriving only from the mere fact of parallel language or the "unseem-
liness" of different high courts differing over the meanings of phrases,
are insufficient to deprive a state supreme court of the right and the
duty to exercise their independent judgment in interpreting their re-
spective state charters, and that federal precedents are to be regarded
as no more than possibly persuasive authority.'"
In the case of the right of privacy, however, the argument that
state courts should, at least to some extent, conform their interpretation
of the state constitution to federal construction of the parallel federal
right is stronger than it would be with respect to other types of rights
guarantees. Since the state right was derived from an originally federal
source, it could be argued that the federal courts' interpretation of that
right reflects a unique level of experience and understanding, and ac-
cordingly that state courts interpreting the derived federal right should
closely follow the results and reasoning of post-adoption federal cases
interpreting that federally-derived right. '4" However, while state consti-
144. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119
Cal, Rptr. 315, 329 (1975); Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives
on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. Puget Sound L.
Rev. 491, 496-97 (1984); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights,
9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 379, 380-82 (1980); Dumbauld, State Precedents for the Bill of Rights,
7 J. Pub. L. 323 (1958). See generally Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights 1776-
1791 (1962).
145. See, Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 301, 450 A.2d 925, 932 (1982),
emphasizing the persuasiveness of federal precedent and "the general advisability in a
federal system of uniform interpretation of identical constitutional provisions."
146. See, e.g., cases cited at supra notes 7 and 8.
147. This approach to interpretation of state rights is not without arguments in its
favor. As Professor Maltz has pointed out, divergence between state and federal courts
on issues of constitutional rights imposes costs no matter what type of constitutional issue
is at stake. Divergence creates additional uncertainty for officials charges with the duty
to conform their actions to the commands of both charters, results in duplication of
effort without, in many cases, any noticeable improvement in the quality of the resulting
analysis, and can create at least the appearance of unprincipled decision making on the
part of one or both courts. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 Tex. L.
Rev. 995, 1002-06 (1985). Moreover, the unique role which the United States Supreme
Court enjoys in our polity-as the one body with the institutional prestige and national
scope to enable it to assume leadership in articulating a common moral and legal basis
for nation-should entitle its decisions to even greater respect than courts typically pay
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tutional draftsmen can explicitly enact such an approach to interpretation
if they so choose, and while a few state courts have in fact chosen to
adopt such an approach with respect to certain state rights' 4s this
"lockstep" approach also fails to provide an appropriate model for
interpretation of the state constitution's express guarantee of privacy 49
for several reasons.
In the first place, this "lockstep" approach suffers from the same
practical difficulty as the "freeze" approach discussed above. Current
to arguably persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions. See generally Sager, supra note
143, at 960-62. These concerns seem particularly cogent in the context of state rights
originally adopted from federal sources, where none of the factors usually relied upon
to justify state divergence from federal precedent-such as differences in text, or a unique
local historical or cultural basis for the right-will generally apply. Interpreting federally-
derived state rights so as to follow the evolution of federal interpretation of cognate
rights would alleviate these concerns by providing some greater degree of certainty and
simplicity in constitutional law. The appearance of agreement among courts, and the
institutional authority of all, would be maximally preserved.
148. For example, the current version of the Florida state constitution's guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures explicitly provides that the rights it grants must,
"be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court," and that evidence obtained in violation
of the state constitution may only be suppressed, "if such articles or information would
be inadmissable under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution." Fla. Const. art I, § 12. This amendment
has been the subject of considerable controversy. See generally, Slobogin, State Adoption
of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's "Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 653 (1987) (criticizing and urging narrow construction of the amendment);
Cooper, Beyond the Federal Constitution: The Status of State Constitutional Law in
Florida, 18 Stetson L. Rev. 241, 275-79 (1989) (disagreeing with Slobogin). The Florida
Supreme Court has not followed Professor Slobogin's suggestions for narrow construction
of the amendment, but has instead given it its full force. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d
988 (Fla. 1988) (rejecting argument that section 12 should be interpreted to require
adherence only to pre-adoption precedent, concluding instead that the electorate clearly
evinced an intent for the provision to apply to all decisions of the U.S.Sup. Ct. regardless
of when they were rendered.); State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1987) (rejecting
argument that a different section of the state constitution permitted Florida to provide
more protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the federal consti-
tution).
A number of other state courts have also adopted the "lockstep" approach to inter-
pretation of other state rights, consciously endeavoring to interpret their state Declarations
so as not to diverge from federal precedent. See Collins, supra note 142, at 1108-11,
1111 n.131; Collins & Galie, supra note 7, at 323-24.
149. Of the states with express privacy guarantees, Illinois has been the most consistent
adherent of the lockstep approach. The Illinois Supreme Court generally will not depart
from federal precedents absent a compelling showing that the drafters of the state's 1970
constitution intended a different result, People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 245, 469 N.E.2d
147, 156 (1984), and has yet to render a decision departing from federal interpretations
in any case involving autonomy rights.
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federal law may well be unsettled or in dispute, particularly where novel
or difficult issues are raised, and will provide no simple or mechanical
way for courts to resolve state constitutional issues.' 50 In addition, the-
ories which presumptively bind state courts to federal interpretations of
cognate rights will have the practical effect of preventing the use of
states as "laboratories" where multiple alternative approaches to con-
stitutional issues can be worked out, thus depriving the nation of the
state courts' constructive participation in the process. 5 ' Even with respect
to rights originally derived from federal sources, structural or "strategic"
considerations may legitimately lead state courts to systematically dif-
ferent results,'5 2 and there is no a priori reason" to presume that state
justices are any less capable of discerning how best to apply those rights
in novel and difficult situations than are their federal colleagues.' 53
Moreover, such an approach would deprive section 5 of any practical
effect. Principles of federal supremacy mandate that federal interpre-
tations of federal rights bind state courts regardless of those state courts'
interpretation of state law. Thus, if state rights are interpreted to do
no more than track federal precedents, they will add nothing to the
effective protection of rights. To be sure, the mere fact that a state
constitutional provision exists does not mean that it must therefore be
interpreted more broadly than federal law. But where state constitutional
draftsmen went to the trouble of creating a new provision covering
rights not previously protected by the state constitution, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that they, and the voters who enacted that provision,
intended their handiwork to have some practical effect. Courts which
rely too heavily on post-adoption federal precedents to interpret their
state constitutions run the risk of ceding effective interpretive authority
over the state constitution to another body, the United States Supreme
Court. While such a delegation may be permissible when done by the
people of the state acting as a political body,'5 4 it is inappropriate when
150. Collins, supra note 142, at 1113-14.
151. See generally Slobogin, supra note 148, at 679-80. As Professor Williams has
argued, decisions on rights issues tend function, as a practical matter, not as final answers
to difficult issues of constitutional rights, but rather as intermediate-though weighty-
steps in an ongoing dialogue involving state and lower federal courts, legislators, consti-
tutional amenders and the people. See Williams, supra note 2, at 359-62. When state
courts, as participants in this ongoing process, disagree with the federal Supreme Court's
interpretations, it is something of an exercise in federal chauvinism to assume that because
the state court's result is different it is therefore unprincipled or merely result oriented.
152. See generally Sager, supra note 143, at 959.
153. See Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7, 8 U.
Puget Sound L. Rev. 331, 353 (1985).
154. Compare, Cooper, Beyond the Federal Constitution: The Status of State Con-
stitutional Law in Florida, 18 Stetson L. Rev. 241, 275-83 (1989), arguing that the 1983
amendment to section 12 of the Florida Declaration of Rights, which required state courts
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imposed by state courts upon themselves. Absent express constitutional
direction to the contrary, state courts have a non-delegable constitutional
duty to consider both state law and those local factors that might
influence interpretation of that law. That duty abides regardless of the
source from which a particular constitutional provision was derived.
While federal precedents-especially those which predated amendment
of the state constitution-may be legitimately considered particularly
persuasive as precedent, no other court, not even the federal Supreme
Court, can fulfill a state court's interpretive duty on that court's behalf. 5
For all of these reasons, Louisiana courts interpreting the state
constitution's guarantee of privacy as it relates to abortion rights should
certainly look upon relevant post-adoption precedents from both the
federal courts and from other states as potentially persuasive authority.
However, none of those precedents can do more than guide the state
courts in their work. The hard questions of what the state constitutional
guarantee of privacy means with respect to abortion-related issues left
open by Roe and Doe must be determined by the state courts exercising
their right and duty to independently interpret the state constitution.
CONCLUSION
The express guarantee of "privacy" in article I, section 5 of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 has been correctly interpreted by the
state Supreme Court to protect a broad range of autonomy rights. It
should also be interpreted to incorporate and independently protect
abortion rights of the sort recognized by the federal Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, regardless of whether those rights
continue to be protected under federal law. With respect to abortion-
related issues not resolved by Roe and Doe, the state courts must exercise
their independent interpretive authority, guided, but not controlled, by
post-1974 federal or sister-state precedents.
to construe the state's search and seizure provision in exact conformity with the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, constituted a perfectly legitimate act on the part of
the Florida electorate. Since it was done by the voters, Professor Cooper argues, the
Florida delegation constitutes no derogation from principles of federalism, but rather "a
classic illustration of participatory democracy in action in a federalist system."
155. See generally Slobogin, supra note 148, at 723-25.
[Vol. 51
